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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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CDU/CSU DREGGER CONCERNED OVER U.S. NEGOTIATIONS WITH USSR

Prague MLADA FRONTA in Czech 8 Jul 81 p 5

[Interview with Ivan Kramar, manager of the territorial sector of the CSSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by Ivan Kulhanek: "For Good Neighborly Relations with the FRG"]

[Text] Alfred Dregger, a representative of the West German clericalist parties CDU/CSU and vice president of their faction in the Federal Parliament, visited the CSSR recently. Upon his return in the FRG, in his several interviews by West German media, he dealt mainly with the contents of his discussions with Dusan Spacil, deputy minister of foreign affairs of the CSSR. In this context we discussed certain conclusions drawn by Alfred Dregger with Ivan Kramar, manager of the territorial sector of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSSR.

[Question] What was the real purpose of Alfred Dregger's visit in the CSSR?

[Answer] Alfred Dregger came to Prague on a private visit, as he said, to get acquainted with our country. He requested a meeting with an official Czechoslovak spokesman. We granted his request and he was received by Deputy Minister Dusan Spacil in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Their discussion was conducted in a frank atmosphere and both parties described it as useful.

[Question] Can you divulge the contents of their discussion?

[Answer] Yes, of course. Most attention was focused on certain aspects of detente. Alfred Dregger defended the position of the current U.S. administration, which was not surprising; he advocated the implementation of the decisions by NATO concerning the deployment of medium-range missiles in West Europe, thus, also in the FRG. Up to that moment he introduced nothing new or astonishing.

However, then a noteworthy, characteristic moment came. As known, widespread public protests against the planned deployment of U.S. missiles on their territories are on the increase in certain West European states, particularly the FRG. The public demands immediate negotiations with the USSR concerning such military hardware and follows with indignation and suspicion the unconcealed reluctance of the USA to accept the offer of negotiations. In that situation even Alfred Dregger, an exponent of the right wing of the CDU/CSU, expressed his doubts about the good will of the U.S. government when he mentioned that he believed in U.S. intentions to sit down at the conference table before the end of this year, but

he added that if the U.S. government should refuse to negotiate, "it would lose our confidence." His statement is noteworthy for yet another reason. It demonstrates how deep has fear affected the FRG population and how high it has reached when the German people were confronted with the prospect that scores of missiles with nuclear warheads are to be deployed on the territory of their state, which would not only increase the military and political dependence of the FRG on the USA, but at the same time also greatly aggravate the danger that the FRG might get dragged into a nuclear conflict against its will and interests.

[Question] Since the FRG media are paying extraordinary attention to the developments in the Polish People's Republic and some right-wing West German groups are trying to meddle in Polish internal affairs, it would be interesting to learn whether, and how, has the discussion touched upon that issue...

[Answer] It touched upon it, albeit tangentially. Alfred Dregger expressed his "alarm" at the developments in the Polish People's Republic and asked our assessment of the situation. We repeated what we always say in that context and what we have said on a number of previous occasions: We support the efforts of all socialist and patriotic forces in the Polish People's Republic and together with other socialist countries we are helping them alleviate and overcome their current problems, particularly their economic depression. It is known, however, that Western media repeat ad nauseam their speculations about some alleged threat of "military assistance" by the Warsaw Pact states. We told Alfred Dregger frankly that such speculations about the "military threat" were being spread in the West and not in our country. Moreover, they are exaggerated so much that in this case they seem to express the wishful thinking of certain Western circles.

[Question] Were questions of mutual CSSR-FRG relations on the agenda?

[Answer] Yes, such questions were discussed. We mentioned that the Agreement on Mutual Relations between the CSSR and the FRG signed in 1973 had opened the correct way, as may be documented by several agreements, treaties and specific achievements in every area. By the same token, the fact cannot be ignored that there remain very many untapped assets, unutilized opportunities and also obstacles hampering the development of mutual cooperation. We have not created them.

[Question] What specifically do you mean by that?

[Answer] For instance, questions are being brought up which in themselves mean gross interference with the internal affairs of our state. In this respect the activity of most of West German media is a typical case. We categorically oppose that, and we also frankly told Alfred Dregger of our attitude.

[Question] Well, then, how should the mutual relations develop?

[Answer] I should like to emphasize that our country supports with full determination and without any reservation the development of good neighborly relations with the FRG based on equality and mutual advantages. Moreover, in our conversations with Alfred Dregger we stressed--as representatives of the federal government had also mentioned in official statements on numerous occasions--that we

approach everything that concerns our relations, including our consular contacts, completely in the spirit of bilateral agreements and decisions of the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference, flexibly and without delay.

We underscored that we are fully prepared to continue along the lines of the progress achieved in this area in recent years, as Lubomir Strougal repeated not long ago in the program statement of the CSSR government. This, however, calls for the other party to the agreement to approach the development of mutual relations without any reservation, with affirmative and constructive policies, with respect for the differences in our social systems, without interfering with each other's internal affairs, by promoting policies that are in the interest of the further development of detente as well as of the consolidation of security and cooperation on our continent.

9004

CSO: 2400/246

KURDISH KAWA ORGANIZATION SMASHED

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 19 Jun 81 pp 1,15

[Text] Ankara--Following the 12 September change in government, one illegal organization after another has been uncovered. As a result of the action termed the "Panther Operation," Ankara Security Directorate Second Department detectives succeeded in completely uncovering the KAWA [expansion unknown] organization, which has been a nightmare for the people living in the east for a period of time. Apprehended were 3 central committee members and 21 militants including officials from the Istanbul, Ankara, Diyarbakir, and Van regions and 7 women. To date KAWA members were responsible for 17 incidents. Among them are the murder of Tunceli public prosecutor Mustafa Gul and Muradiye municipal chairman Selahattin Mehmetagaoglu, and robbery of the Mus State Produce Farm, the Adiyaman Title Deed Land Registry Directorate, and a freight train transporting goods worth millions of liras to Iran. It has been determined that, because of discord within the organization, the militants began a purge, and two of the militants were killed as accounts were being settled.

In the meantime, it has been announced that operations in and around Diyarbakir have resulted in the confiscation of 135 antiaircraft and rocket launchers belonging to the militants.

Panther Operation

The Panther Operation was initiated by the Ankara Security Directorate Second Department for the purpose of exposing the KAWA organization, which caused blood to pour in eastern Anatolia for a period of time and which conducted action upon action in order to establish the Independent United Democratic Kurdish State.

When it was determined that Ali Bicer, official of the Cincin district, had killed the Muradiye municipal chairman, this dangerous militant was arrested. In the light of information obtained from militants, detectives spread to the four corners of the nation and first captured Sefik Gulacti, official of the Diyarbakir-Silvan region, in Elazig. Later it was learned from documents that were obtained that a secret meeting would be held in

a house on Kecioren Foca Street in Ankara by high-ranking KAWA officials. As a result of a raid on the house, arrested while making important decisions were Kemal Artuc, who is known by the code name, "Doctor"; central committee member Suleyman Aslan, whose code name is "Teacher"; Kemal Gultekin, who goes by the code name, "Hunchback"; Celal Avci, an official of the Ankara, Diyarbakir, and Van regions; chemical engineer Ibrahim Gurbuz, official of the Istanbul region; Meral Gundogan, member of the Istanbul provincial committee; and organization sympathizer Aynur Ugur. Thereafter, the organization began to be pulled apart in quick order. Ankara provincial committee member Yusuf Akkaya, who is a middle-school teacher in Bitlis, was arrested in Bitlis. Later, other organization personnel were taken into custody.

Militants that have been apprehended are:

Artuc, Aslan, Gultekin, Gurbuz, Avci, Veysel Simsek, Gulacti, Meral Gundogan, Nilgun Bostancioglu, Gulfer Celiker, Ulku Sarikaya, Ayse Pervin Danisment, Nesrin Danisment, Ali Danisment, Aynur Oguz, Akkaya, Ali Binici, Musa Aslan, Bunyamin Fidanay, Metir Fatanli, and Varol Soyuyuce.

Southeastern Operation

In the meantime, 135 militants from the KAWA organization were arrested in Diyarbakir and neighboring provinces in operations conducted on various dates. Apprehended were three security officers and terrorists known to have killed 11 persons. An antiaircraft machine gun, a rocket launcher, and automatic weapons were also confiscated.

An announcement was made by the Provinces of Diyarbakir, Hakkari, Mardin, Siirt, Urfa, and Van Martial Law Commandant Press and Public Relations Directorate. It reads:

"1. Since the beginning of June, 135 members of KAWA, one of the destructive and divisive organizations that act illegally so as to split apart our nation, destroy the existing system of government, and replace it with a state that pursues Marxist-Leninist ideology, have been arrested in the region in which the martial law commandant is responsible. Of these, 84 were held.

"After evaluating statements taken by security forces and new information that was obtained, 31 additional militants were arrested during the first half of June along with officials belonging to the "Red Partisans" group of the organization who make up its Diyarbakir regional, provincial, neighborhood, school, and educational committees.

"The 31 militants that were taken into custody include:

"A. Two policemen, a private from the military police, and the murderers of 11 persons including seven civilians.

"B. The persons who wounded seven persons including four security guards.

"C. Persons who clashed with security forces at various times.

"D. Persons who took part in shootings using various weapons, in bombings, hanging placards, distributing communiques, and writing articles.

"E. Persons who used arms and force to hinder freedom in education and to collect money.

"F. It had been established that these persons had robbed a jeweler's shop in Diyarbakir, and statements of the suspects confirmed that this was true.

"2. Also seized with the militants, primarily from hiding places in the hills, were an antiaircraft machine gun, a rocket launcher, eight G-1 and G-3 infantry rifles, 31 pistols of various types, a mimeograph machine, and several documents."

11673

CSO: 4654/70

BRIEFS

VOLVO NORTH SEA ACTIVITY--What was meant to be Volvo's port of entry into the Norwegian oil adventure ended in failure. The purchase of the Norwegian offshore company Vigor, southwest of Trondheim, will cost Volvo considerable losses and last Sunday the company announced to Vigor employess that it would begin a controlled shutdown. "We have said that we will avoid bankruptcy, but we will gradually reduce the number of our employees until activity on the Norwegian Continental Shelf picks up," said Thorbjorn Ustaheim, chairman of the board of Vigor. It was just 1 year ago that Volvo Energi bought Vigor through a development company called Nordex. Volvo Energi had as its partner the Norwegian company Orkla Industrier. The partnership was dissolved, however, when Vigor entered into a dispute with the American oil Company Amoco over a hotel platform constructed by Vigor last year. It was to cost 50 million kroner, but the price was increased by 70 million kroner. According to Vigor, this was because of additional requirements by Amoco. Amoco refused to pay the cost overruns and this put Vigor into an acute liquidity crisis. Orkla refused to put up any money and instead it gave its stock in Nordex to Volvo Energy, at a loss of 12 million kroner to Orkla. For a while it looked as though Vigor would emerge from the crisis, since Volvo put up a guarantee of 50 million kroner and the Norwegian Industrial Fund offered an additional 15 million kroner. A prerequisite, however, was that Vigor would receive a 100 million kroner order for a module to be used in a Statoil platform. It is now clear that the company will not be given that order. A formal decision has not yet been made by Mobil and Statoil who are the operators, but Vigor's bid is about 15 percent higher than two foreign competitors. Vigor will provide employment for 80 percent of its 300 employees until April 1982. After that the order books are empty. [Article by Bjorn Lindahl] [Text] [Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 14 Jul 81 p 7]

CSO: 3109/224

CHAMBER CAMPAIGNS AGAINST CONTROLS

Nicosia CYPRUS MAIL in English 31 Jul 81 p 1

[Text] Any extension of the role and powers of the Prices Committee could only undermine the country's economy, says the Cyprus Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

The Chamber, as well as the Employers' Federation, maintains that trying to curb prices through controls amounts to fighting the symptoms and not the causes of inflation.

In its statement yesterday the Chamber suggests that the Ministers of Finance and Commerce and Industry should sponsor as early as possible a tripartite meeting--of government, employers' and employees' representatives--to decide on the "minimum measures" needed to meet inflation and the economic crisis.

The Chamber emphatically disagrees with the notion that extensive price controls and "policing of prices" curb inflation, and says that this policy has failed both in capitalist and socialist countries, and more recently the new socialist French government of Francois Mitterrand has declared its resolute support for the freeing of prices in industry.

Causes

The causes of inflation in Cyprus are both external--international recession and energy crisis, imported inflation--and internal, like over-consumption, increases in government spending, lower investment rates, savings and productivity, leading to higher costs of production.

It is obvious, the Chamber says, that the most effective way to deal with the internal causes lies in curbing labour costs which are the biggest component of the final cost of production both for agricultural and industrial produce.

Therefore, it says, special attention should be given to keeping wage increases within the endurance limits of the economy.

In this respect the Chamber notes that during the period from January 1979 to April 1981 the prices of Cyprus industrial products increased by 40 percent, whilst prices of imported items rose by only 18 percent and this has been a serious blow to the competitiveness of Cypriot industry both in home and foreign markets.

Negative

The labour representatives on the Prices Committee, by adopting a negative attitude in determining what is a fair profit, and shouting slogans about super-profits have led many a business to the brink of collapse, are destroying the investment climate and creating unemployment, the Chamber of Commerce says.

Therefore, it adds, insistence on price controls raises reasonable doubts as to the real aims and policies of the unions.

The Chamber's statement concludes with an appeal to all parties to place the interests of the country above any subjective pursuits, and urges the Ministers of Commerce and Industry and Finance to invite the representatives of the three parties--government, employers and employees--to work minimum measures to deal with inflation and the economic crisis.

CSO: 4600/116

COLOR TV PROGRAMS TO EXPAND

Nicosia CYPRUS MAIL in English 24 Jul 81 p 1

[Text]

THE Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation plans to expand its colour TV programmes during the current year and hopes that by next year it will be possible to start colour advertisements.

The Director-General of the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) Mr A. Christofides made the announcement at a press conference at which he referred to the efforts of the CBC to overcome the financial difficulties it encounters and to keep up its programme of reequipment with advanced technology.

He explained that the problem for the CBC was not one of cutting expenses but of finding more revenue, and emphasised that the difficulty was that it was addressing itself to a comparatively small population.

The expenses would be the same whether the radio and television services were beamed to half a million or three million people, but the difference in numbers made all the difference in revenue.

Fees

Any cut in expenditure would be linked with a reduction of staff but reduction of

staff and eventual curtailment of services would mean regression and also lower revenue from advertising, he said.

Mr Christofides said that the CBC revenue under the new law (contributions based on electricity consumption) was £1,450,000 in 1980 and the charge was on average £13 per household; the higher rate is £30, but 14 per cent of the population are exempt because of low consumption of electricity.

This, he said, is the lowest charge for any service and amounts to 80 mils a day at a time when the price of a newspaper is 100 mils now.

Mr Christofides thought that the highest charge should reach £45 per household and he wanted the government's present £200,000 subsidy for services rendered to be raised too.

CBC had by the end of 1979 a deficit of £2,400,000 and another £600,000 was added in

1980. The current year was expected to produce an additional deficit of £670,000, he said.

Losses

Mr Christofides spoke of the tremendous losses it suffered as a result of the coup and the invasion.

During the period 1974 to 1979 CBC was losing £1 million from advertisements at a time when the call for additional services was mounting both in Cyprus and abroad.

Mr Christofides denied that there was any misuse of funds and explained that a check of CBC financial affairs is regularly carried out.

In answer to questions Mr Christofides said that CBC television reached 97.5 per cent of the government-controlled area and there are also telecasts with Turkish translations for the Turkish Cypriots.

CBC launches new programmes as from September next with new European and Greek films. New substations are being added so that the whole of Cyprus can be covered.

COUNTRY HAS LOWEST INDUSTRY INVESTMENT RATE IN EC

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 6 Jul 81 pt 11 p 2

[Article by Frank Dahlgaard: "The Investments Have Dropped More in Denmark than in Other EC Countries"]

[Text] The commercial investments in Denmark are now completely down to the 1968 level, and the red alarm lamp will soon light up...

During the 1970's Denmark has had a greater drop in the investment activity than any other country in the European Community.

This was shown by calculations which the West German research institute, IFO [Institute for Economic Research], has carried out. The results of the calculations are presented in the publication IFO-digest, March 1981, and BERLINGSKE presents here in the figure a picture of the investment development in the EC countries:

With 1975 as a point of departure, the West German investments have grown most (25 percent), while England and Denmark lie clearly at the bottom with investments in 1981 of 94 and 90 percent, respectively, of the 1975 investment level.

The figure shows the development in fixed prices in all investments in the countries indicated. Both commercial investments as well as housing construction and public investments have thus been included in the calculation.


Strong Drops

The unheard-of strong drop in the Danish investments since 1979 reflect, for one thing, the Danish building crisis and the politicians' slowing down in the public construction activities. The drop in the agricultural investments and in the industrial investments also help to get the Danish investment curve to drop precipitously from 1979 to 1981.

The Danish placement at the bottom is not changed by choosing a different point of reference for the calculations, on the contrary.

Using the investment level in 1970 as a point of reference, the total Danish investments this year were 15 percent lower. England also keeps its placement in

¹ UDVIKLINGEN I INVESTERINGERNE
I EF-LANDENE UNDER KRISEN.



Total investments in Denmark have dropped more than in any other EC country during the crisis. Sources: Euro-Invest, IFO-digest, March 1980, volume 4. [Key on following page]

Key:

1. The development in the investments in the EC countries during the crisis.
2. Index
3. Germany
4. Italy
5. The Netherlands
6. France
7. Belgium
8. England
9. Denmark

the next-to-the-last position with 1981 investments which lie a good 1 percent below the 1970 level. For all the other EC countries the investment activity this year lies higher than in 1970.

As compared to the 1970 situation, however, it is France which has had the strongest investment improvement, and Belgium comes in second place. West Germany comes only as number three when 1970 is chosen as reference point instead of 1975. The Danish placement at the bottom, however, is unwavering...

The IFO Figures

The IFO figures do not directly support the evaluation which Prime Minister Anker Jorgensen recently has presented, according to which Denmark should be one of the West European countries which has managed best through the economic crisis.

The chief economist of Privatbanken, cand. polit. Torben Nielsen, tells BERLINGSKE that the total commercial investments in Denmark now are all the way down to the 1968 level. We are thus alarmingly close to the instant when the red alarm lamp flashes because the production apparatus no longer can be maintained.

According to Torben Nielsen one can as a rough rule of thumb expect that the average life of commercial investments is approximately 15 years. When our investments therefore drop to the same level as 15 years ago, we are in a situation where the production apparatus can just be maintained. If the drop in investments continues from this point, it means that our production apparatus starts to crumble--to become smaller. Then the real foundation of our welfare society will be undermined.

Today we can see that the commercial investments are down to the same level as 13 years ago. The red alarm lamp will thus soon start to flash for Denmark if the situation is not corrected.

Construction Investments

If the commercial investments are broken down according to construction investments and machinery investments, the picture does not become brighter. Machine investments in the economy today are down to "only" the 1970 level, while the construction investments are turned back all the way to the 1960 level.

This fact must give the more reflective people within the trade movement a reason to reflect. The very low construction investments in the economy are namely an expression for a desire for an expansion in capacity, which to a high degree will mean more jobs. The machinery investments, on the other hand, reflect to a higher degree an improved efficiency, which frequently means a smaller number of jobs.

The Danish production apparatus today is not large enough so that we can produce and export to get out of the crisis (i.e., the unemployment and the balance of payments deficit). If it becomes more profitable to produce and sell/export goods, we must expect an upturn in investments. This desirable upturn in the commercial investments will inexorably be accompanied by an upturn in the imports

from abroad, since a great deal of production equipment will be purchased abroad. In a transition phase, the balance of payments deficit will therefore grow.

The present quite modest deficit in the balance of payments is only an expression for Denmark's deep, economic depression, where few people find it worthwhile to invest in anything else than passive government bonds.

8958

CS0: 3106/142

GOVERNMENT, NON-SOCIALIST PARTNERS AGREE ON BUSINESS AID

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 6 Jul 81 pt 11 p 1

[Article by Lisbeth Knudsen: "300 Million Extra to the Economy. Agreement Between the Government and the Conciliation Parties"]

[Text] The direct appropriations to support the economy will be increased in the next two years by 300 million kroner as compared to the extent of the support this year. This is what the government has agreed on with its conciliation parties-- R, CD and KRF--in connection with the development of the new economic support and employment plan, which is now being worked into the financial legislative proposal for 1982.

In the plan for this year 2.5 billion kroner have been set aside to support the economy. For 1982 the appropriation to support the economy and the employment plan will be 2.8 billion kroner, and the same is true in 1983. The increase in the appropriation of 300 million kroner covers a series of changes in the assignment of means as compared to this year.

Within the industry ministry there is thus a considerable increase in the support for exports. This year 75.8 million kroner have been appropriated in the employment plan, while during the next two years 136 million kroner will be appropriated each year. The export credit arrangement gets to increase the means from 3.6 million kroner to 8.7 million kroner. The [scrambled] development assistance is raised from 163.1 million kroner to 176 million kroner. The support for product development is raised from 65 million kroner to barely 82 million kroner. A new support is being provided for establishing new and for recently established activities for 20 million kroner in both 1982 and 1983.. A series of existing arrangements are being continued in the next two years.

In the fisheries field the appropriations are reduced for test fisheries and instead the structural contributions for the fisheries trade and the fisheries industry are being increased. In the field of agriculture the support framework for drainage and irrigation will be reduced by one-half in 1982-83, while the expenses for substitute arrangements in agriculture increase from 6 million kroner per year to 16 million kroner in 1982-83. A streak of existing support arrangements for agriculture, forestry and horticulture continues in 1982-83.

An amount of 3 million kroner for P and T's [Post and Telephone] collaboration with Danish industry has been listed for 1982-83 just like this year on the employment plan within the area of the minister of traffic.

The tax minister contributes with the largest total amount for the economic support arrangements in the employment plan. It amounts to 1.2 billion kroner for a continuation of the tax relief for the economy, which has been introduced effective this year. It involves especially investment deductions, goodwill taxation and similar.

8958

CS0: 3106/142

CHEAPER, FOREIGN-MADE PRODUCTS REPLACING LOCAL PRODUCTS

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 21 Jul 81 p 11

[Article by gl.: "Triumph International Closes Plants in Passau and Straubing — More and More Manufacturing Being Shifted to Less Expensive Foreign Countries/ 12 German Production Sites Left"]

[Text] Triumph International Group, Munich — The manufacturer of foundation garments, underwear, swimwear and terrycloth goods is increasingly reducing its capacities in the FRG in order to take advantage of opportunities for less expensive production operations abroad. Triumph is planning to close its plants in Straubing and Passau at the end of 1981. Approximately 250 employees will be affected by this measure. As of the end of 1980, the German-Swiss company employed a total of 3,890 people in Germany, but as many as 20,040 throughout the world. The company's management has said that at least 40 to 50 employees in Straubing could find work at the Regensburg plant, 40 km away. Negotiations are under way on a social benefits plan. The company has already made the financial arrangements: Reserves of DM 6.1 million are being set aside for social benefits plans, though in this case the full amount will not be used.

Once these plants have been shut down, Triumph will be maintaining 12 factories in the FRG: 6 in Bavaria and 6 in Baden-Wuerttemberg. Only last year the company's personnel figures for Germany had been reduced by 140 people, but company executives explain that this was accomplished by attrition. There seem to be no further closings planned for the time being, but the company is continuing to work on rationalization and the introduction of new techniques. Moreover, it is being pointed out that today it takes only one-third the 1965 stitching capacity to manufacture the same number of foundation garment pieces, and that costs for a single minute of stitching time have risen by 439 percent in the last 15 years, while selling prices could be increased by little more than an average of 10 percent during the same period. Company executives complain that personnel costs rose from DM 132.2 million to DM 139.9 million last year despite the reduced number of employees.

Management has also indicated that the company is getting a better return on its investment in foreign countries than it is at home. Board member Dr Lothar Sickinger notes that although annual profits for 1980 worldwide — DM 26 million — were smaller than for the year before (DM 30 million), the worldwide operating result had been even better than for the preceding year. Nonetheless, only guaranteed dividends are still being declared.

Annual profits in the FRG have most recently dropped from DM 5.2 million to DM 1.2 million. And Triumph's most recent earnings in the FRG, DM 321.3 million, amount to less than one-third of its international business — which has increased by 23 percent to somewhat more than DM 1 billion. This was a comparatively small increase of 5.7 percent. Business was better in the rest of Europe, with a 19 percent increase to 308.4 million francs, while the best showing was made overseas, with a 36.9-percent increase to 601 million Hongkong dollars (DM 353 million).

Unlike earlier years, however, Triumph was able this time to profit from the development of the DM exchange rate. The growing importance to this company of foreign markets, presently the Far East and South America in particular, is also revealed in a comparison of employee figures: as many as 10,445 overseas and 5,705 in Europe.

Though the company has been able to show increased sales for the FRG, this is due in no small measure to apparently vigorous efforts. It was possible to reverse a year-long decline in sales of foundation garments, the company's main product line; sales amounted to DM 237.2 million (DM 222.5 million for the preceding year). Management figures show that the market as a whole continued to decline, but Triumph was able to use its 6.6 percent increase to expand its role as leader of the market.

The company plans to follow suit in its other product lines as well. Now the object of special attention are swimwear and beachwear, styles in which Triumph has been forced to take losses despite growth in that market. Here the company management is now pushing products aimed at the youthful buyer in particular. Furthermore, it is promoting a sports collection called "Golden Cup," while prophesying vigorous growth rates for this market. The offerings include things like beach robes, warm-up suits and jogging attire. The company is planning to invest DM 27 or 28 million again this year (DM 30 million last year).

7458

CSO: 3103/378

NONGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER FOR LDC'S

Paris LE MONDE in French 5-6 Jul 81 p 3

[Report by Gerard Viratelle of speech by Jean-Pierre Cot, Minister of Cooperation and Development]

[Text] Delivering his "first remarks as the first minister of development" of a French government, Mr Jean-Pierre Cot, at the recent meeting of the Nongovernmental Development Organizations [ONG], spoke in favor of a self-management model for the Third World countries, an increased outlay and a change in France's policy regarding them. "A socialist policy," he said, must be "responsive to the needs" expressed in numerous statements by the LDC's [lesser developed countries]. "Their disastrous situation is," according to the minister of cooperation and development, "not the result of a misfortune but rather of a systematic and age-long exploitation. It is the direct prolongation of the colonial pact" (bald mercantilism; importation of techniques and structures, and of educational, public health and other systems unsuited to their needs). However, he said, "although paternalism should be rejected and dictation of a model to the Third World avoided," a type of development that responds to their desires must nevertheless be offered them.

It was to assert from the start, "through a change in title, a break" with the colonial connotations that for so long a time have been associated with the Ministry of Cooperation, that Mr Cot, innovatively, had the concept of development added to his title. This concept "must clearly convey not merely an idea of a somewhat charitable type of aid, too often characterized by a superior-to-inferior relationship, but rather the intent to associate France in a dialogue among equals."¹

One of his concerns is to ventilate this ministry with some fresh air and to get persons with diverse viewpoints to participate in "think groups" on development and its practical aspects. The minister does not intend immediately to request enlargement of the geographic extent of cooperation. He intends, on the other hand to place the emphasis on development, and in this regard he has been designated by Mr Cheysson to represent France in the principal international meetings

1) In an interview with CROISSANCE DES JEUNES NATIONS, Jul-Aug issue; 163, Boulevard Malesherbes 75859 Cedex 17.

where these problems and North-South relations are to be discussed. He will head the preparation, by France, of a United Nations conference on the LDC,s to be held in Paris 1-14 September.

At that conference, France will state her policy change, but change is first to be translated in a truthful presentation of the statistics. Mr Cot has instructed his services to no longer include DOM-TOM [Overseas Departments-Overseas Territories] credits in the public aid totals. He also plans to publish an "adjustment" to the figures published by the OECD (LE MONDE 26 June): French aid does not total 0.62 percent of GNP but rather 0.32 percent, which places our country not fifth but 11th among the industrialized nations.

For the Third World countries, the minister said to the ONG meeting, the change means they will embark on the road to an autochthonous, endogenous development. A development based on the satisfying of internal needs can sometimes involve breaking away from international markets and call for a strengthening of cooperation among developing countries (South-South cooperation) as well as for necessary regional regroupments "looking toward the year 2000." In sum, the minister would like to encourage everything that can increase food production first, then contribute to the strengthening of the "basic communities" and to the political and economic independence of the Third World countries. A concept such as this, responding to the basic concerns of the ONG's, must incorporate the new cooperation policy, "technology transfers," and industrial investments.

The minister deems the role of the ONG's to be "very important, indeed, essential," since these organizations in general have access to persons having knowledge and experience, particularly "of the field." "There are certain things the state cannot do, wherein its role is complementary; and when we speak of cooperation among peoples, it is through the ONG's that it can be carried out," he said. Defining the relationship between the state and the ONG's, he stated that governmental aid must be increased from the standpoint of "rebalancing" France's contribution, and that, on the other hand, the intervention of the public authorities must be diminished. There will be "no heavy-handed tutelage or recoupment"; the authorities will limit their function to "maintaining a vigilant oversight" on the effectiveness and capacity of the ONG's for participating in a "new developmental approach."

Lastly, Mr Cot said that too few French citizens are responsive to these problems. "To the antifascist mobilization of the 1930's, to the anticolonialist and anti-imperialist mobilization of the 1960's," he proposed, "let us now add the Third Worldist mobilization."

9399

CSO: 3100/867

CFDT LEADER ON STRIKES, PATRONAT, NEW POLICIES, CGT, PCF

Paris L'UNITE in French 4 Jul 81 pp 4-5

[Interview by Michele Kespri with Edmond Maire]

[Text] The CFDT [French Democratic Confederation of Labor] held its national meeting on the eve of the legislative elections. On the agenda, of course, were the new political situation and the strategy of the second French group of affiliated trade unions in this period of profound change. Scarcely 15 days after the victory, the general secretary of the CFDT, Edmond Maire, discussed these topics for L'UNITE. And many others...

[Question] The CFDT fought for the victory of the left. It applauded the results of the presidential and legislative elections. Can you elaborate on the reasons for this satisfaction?

[Answer] The change which has taken place in the country has shaken up the workers and wage earners who vote with the left and who, after years of successive political defeats, had ended by no longer believing in a victory. And all at once, hope has returned. For us trade unionists, this is a useful topic for reflection: all our efforts to "reconstruct hope" were indispensable to the maturation of the change. But it was ultimately a political event, and not a trade union event, which made it click.

[Question] The announcement of a future debate within the CFDT?

[Answer] Not at all. The type of trade union action that we have been conducting for 3 years was more effective, we believe, than many of the speeches of all types to prove that our country was in an impasse, that it no longer had anything to look forward to with respect to recovery of the employment situation, that even liberties were dwindling. We gave a concrete demonstration of this. It is not a question of taking the lion's share, but we feel we are among the best architects of the change.

[Question] What precise hopes does a trade union like the CFDT base on the presence of a socialist government?

[Answer] We are particularly attentive to two major aspects of the government's policy.

The first is a problem of method. This is what I mean. We appreciated Francois Mitterrand's campaign: instead of luring the population with political power that tomorrow would settle only the basic problems, the socialist candidate situated himself at the outset in problematics of dialogue and negotiation. Now, for us, only negotiation makes it possible for workers to be truly recipients of change. It is also the only way to respond to the immense diversity of situations. We are very attached to this method, and we hope the government will practice it with continuity, even if the employers block negotiations for a time.

The second aspect of the government policy must consist of an exacting but progressive policy, in order to truly win, to succeed. The accumulation of uncontrolled measures entailing grave economic difficulties must be avoided; they ultimately would turn against the workers, against the left itself.

In summary, we hope the government does include in its problematics both the need for change and the particulars of the economic situation, which cannot be changed abruptly.

[Question] In your opinion, what type of change should the new political situation result in?

[Answer] In view of the crisis, technological transformations and the new relations with the underdeveloped countries, changes are indispensable: in the industrial field as well as in the scale of wages and in social relations. These changes do not come of themselves! They will inevitably encounter resistance from everywhere; on the part of the employers, of course. But not exclusively.

[Question] Where else could this resistance come from?

[Answer] Take the example of a munitions plant reconverting to an enterprise exporting infrastructures to the underdeveloped countries. Well, that supposes changes of qualifications, often bringing up difficult questions again.

Another example: look at the enormous inequality of incomes and salaries in our country. Reducing their range will run up against resolute opposition by the ruling strata of our society. Who, for the most part, are rightist. But not all!

A government can make headway on the path of a change of type of development and society only by having the population participate, in a conscious manner, in the elaboration of a different collective project. For only mobilization of everyone will make it possible to gradually overcome the multiple obstacles associated with a profound transformation. In fact, this is what we really expect from this government.

[Question] What role could a trade union organization play to work for this change? How does the CFDT intend to situate itself in this political situation which is unusual and uncertain?

[Answer] If the government is left alone to perform this immense task, it will be blocked very quickly: by the national and international employer forces, by the internal resistance of everyone in the population who will put on the brakes.

[Question] You are alluding to sociological sluggishness?

[Answer] Yes. To cultural sluggishness as well. For in our society the elitist norms such as the traditional hierarchies are still largely accepted. The action of the social forces in a large sense and of trade union forces above all, is a major factor for overcoming this resistance, the main thrust, of course, comes from the employers.

We are seeing it already with the discussions on the length of the work week where the CNPF [National Council of French Employers] is playing the worst politics: it wants to compel the government to legislate, to impose a 35-hour work week. That would consequently leave its hands free to complain loudly about state socialism, collectivism and authoritarianism and would provide it with a pretext for blaming the new government for all economic difficulties. What is more, a governmental policy which would attempt to force employers to retreat solely by the legislative path, without social mobilization, would lead to a situation not like the Chilean--we would not witness a populist revolt by average employers--but would result in discreet, systematic and effective braking by the chiefs of business. Refusal to invest, a halt in hiring, and price increases would be the tactics employed.

[Question] You envisage passive resistance by the employer, then?

[Answer] I hesitate to use the word. Ultimately, yes, I am thinking of measures of passive resistance which would block the government if strong trade union pressure were not exercised. This is precisely the role of the trade union movement, and I think that the government understands it. The socialist officials have integrated ideas that Leon Blum failed to consider, it seems to me. At the Riom trial in 1942, Blum evoked the June 1936 strikes, speaking of "the social explosion which struck down my government at the moment of its creation."

The present socialist leaders have gone beyond this type of reasoning, I think. They know that in the face of employer resistance, strong, dynamic trade union action and good articulation of trade union action and government action constitute a condition for success. On the other hand, presenting social peace as the ultimate goal of a leftist government leads directly to an impasse.

[Question] When you mention strong trade union action, are you also thinking of strikes?

[Answer] Yes. We must negotiate, have discussions at all levels, but I do not think that direct action must be ruled out for all that. For my part, limiting ourselves to a discussion on the future between trade union leaders and government leaders seems to me inadequate.

Of course, the forms of trade union action must be different than before. Pressure on the administration is no longer a priority. It is now a question of working out alternative solutions collectively in debate with the workers in order to be able to promote constructive all-around proposals.

[Question] Let us return, if you please, to the prospects of negotiations. For example, as far as the 35-hour work week is concerned, what do you expect from the government? What exactly are your demands in this regard? And how do you expect to check the employer's obstruction tactics of which you spoke just now?

[Answer] The question of the 35-hour work week must not be a simple propaganda theme. Reducing the legal work week from 40 hours to 35 hours is not the problem. That would amount to having 4 additional hours paid to 25 percent of wage earners: i.e., a salary increase without any creation of employment. This is not our aim. What we want is to reduce the effective work week--41 hours on the average today--to 35 actual hours. But there we are talking about the average. Now there are enterprises where they are still working 48 hours a week, the maximum.

[Question] That is the case, I think, in many small enterprises. Those which threaten to be the most reluctant with respect to the 35-hour week...

[Answer] Those, it is true, for which the 35-hour week creates the most problems. Especially if one wishes, at the same time, to increase the SMIC [Interoccupational Minimum Growth Wage] in purchasing power by 30 percent. If one takes the extreme cases, where the work week must be reduced by 13 hours, while increasing the SMIC and at the same time including the fifth week of paid leave which these small enterprises do not have, that implies a 5-year period. On the condition that an economic policy is established to help these enterprises cope.

[Question] Government measures have already been taken in this direction.

[Answer] We must go still farther. The small French enterprises are just managing to keep going and survive often without any effort at modernization, paying very low salaries. We have the lowest worker salaries in Europe. In other European countries the small enterprises have worker salaries which are markedly higher and they are surviving very well. It must be said that they have often been subjected to a policy of raising low salaries while being obligated to modernize. Well, that is the path that we must follow. Of course, not everything can be done right away. We need a gradual approach, uniting the reduction of the work week with a concomitant precise and firm economic policy.

Without forgetting the extremely desparate starting situation: 48 hours in certain cases, 38 or 39 hours in other sectors. And economic contexts which are also very different. This is why we feel that the best place for negotiation is the branch. Wanting to regulate the solution of such a complex problem totally will give us only very deceptive results. It is possible, to mitigate the disparities somewhat by national interprofessional negotiations or by a law. But to our minds, we cannot settle the corresponding question of the 35-hour work week and the creation of jobs.

[Question] Then what do you propose?

[Answer] First, we demonstrate the pertinence of our approach, we explain publicly, we convince the government or we win its agreement on this point. Up to this point, everything is ok.

After that, things get complicated. The employers are obstructing, for reasons more political than economic: they want to retain the possibility of blaming the administration. They want to sabotage the new political idea and are trying to impose a third, economic round. These obstruction tactics translates two ways. On one hand, the employers reject the objective of the 35-hour week. On the other hand they again want national interprofessional negotiation to decide on general and indiscriminate abolition of the compulsory rules with respect to organization of

work time (night work, Sunday work, alternate teams, etc.). They thus hope to obtain the maximum flexibility in order to have people work as they wish, while avoiding making serious commitments to reduce the work week. The employers have exactly the same attitude as at the last negotiation, which failed at the end of two years in July 1980.

As early as the first tripartite meeting convened by the Prime Minister on 12 June we detected and denounced this snare. We immediately said: searching for an interprofessional framework agreement will once again lead us to failure: branch negotiations--in which trade unions and employers can best evaluate with precision how to reduce the work week and create jobs while modifying the organization of labor where necessary--must begin immediately. We were not understood by either the employers or our trade union partners. And once again we found ourselves at the 22 June meeting between trade union and employer organizations. There we encountered the difficulties to which I alluded just now. They will not be overcome, in our opinion, in time for the next 6 July meeting if the CNPF does not revise its position from top to bottom.

[Question] Do you believe in such a revision?

[Answer] Nothing today offers any hope of it. We are probably headed for impasse.

[Question] How do you expect to emerge from it?

[Answer] Normally such a confirmed situation would have to result in more intense trade union action: collective debates in each enterprise, work stoppages and strikes to induce each employer to negotiate on the work week.

But since the congresses are close at hand, all we can predict is the beginning of information and action. Although surprising social reactions have already been experienced in the past. And I add in passing that those who believe that the serene confidence existing today among workers with regard to the government shows social apathy, are deceiving themselves. The political change, a factor of confidence, implies, rather, hope, dynamics portending the future. While because of employer resistance the horizon remains dark, there will be major social mobilization in France, in the direction of the government policy announced and approved by the French on 10 May. Moreover, the government must not fear the trade union reactions but should be delighted with them. That said, in judging the positive effect of the political change on the social dynamics, we are not a prior advocate of generalized strikes.

All the more so as the government has its role to play. All the pressures which it can exercise to induce the employers to make better dispositions, for example by reducing the maximum work week and by imposing compensation in time off for each additional hour worked, will, I think, be very well received by the wage earners.

[Question] Paradoxically, you have already several times expressed the idea of "reintegrating the employers in the social game." Can you elaborate?

[Answer] A temptation may exist, with trade unionists or among the members of the government, to repay the employers in their own coin, to want to put them out of the game, as we were ourselves with respect to the Giscard-Ceyrac alliance. We said at the time that this was a very bad solution, that it was unacceptable to exclude us

from all discussion because our ideas were opposed to those of the employers. Today, despite a balance of forces which is much better for us, we continue to think the same way. We persist in believing that the existence, development, dynamism and modernization of the private enterprises constitute the condition for social success. For this reason we reject the idea of the employers' being shut up or shutting themselves up in a ghetto from which they would silently sabotage any positive evolution for French society. Action, trade union as well as governmental, must aim at opening true negotiations with all forces present.

[Question] Do you also want an approach of negotiation with respect to nationalization?

[Answer] Of course. We also want a debate uniting those most concerned, the wage earners of nationalizable enterprises. On this subject the CFDT wants their social status to remain defined within the framework of the collective conventions of their branch in order not to increase the number of individual statuses.

[Question] How do they see the nationalization themselves?

[Answer] Like the other changes that have taken place in our viewpoint and in the government's: they must be successful! And in order for them to succeed, the means must be given. Symbolic nationalization to satisfy ideological taboos, nationalization that amounts to judicial transfer from an all-powerful, private proprietor to a government proprietor that is also all powerful, nationalization with a change in proprietor and a new identical enterprise, these are the three dangers to be avoided. If only to give all Frenchmen who are still hesitant a good image of nationalized enterprise, entailing the diffusion of power in society and greater economic and social efficiency.

Here, too, an abstract and general rule must not be adopted to solve problems, but we must consider case by case, group by group which industrial policy is desirable. Which of the production channels which are too fragile must be rebuilt? What policy should there be for exporting on the world market? What policy for research? At the same time, what types of power will influence the evolution of these enterprises? What division of powers between the national democratic plan, the regions and the workers of the enterprise? All that remains to be defined in the contractual relations between these three loci of power.

Once this work is done group by group, we can then go on to search for the type of public control most appropriate to the general approach. This is a method to which the CFDT will firmly adhere.

[Question] Considering the complexity of this approach, I suppose that you foresee fairly long delays?

[Answer] We want to take our time in order to do it right. But note: it is not a question of taking our time in order to abandon some nationalizations along the way!

[Question] During certain negotiations you are going to talk with the communist ministers?

[Answer] That presents no problem for us. Whether the person we talk to is socialist or communist is not our business. For us there is only one governmental policy. The president of the republic and the prime minister felt that the presence of the communist ministers would not undermine its consistent and lasting character: accordingly they obtained the assurance that the communist party's successive veerings would stop for a while.

[Question] Why do you say, for a while?

[Answer] Because I do not think that the communist party has changed profoundly. It has adopted a new tactic, of course. It is still changing it very often even now, to the point of having disoriented a number of its voters. On the other hand, as it never stopped repeating that it is not changing its strategy, we remain perplexed as to what the communist party's aims are at any of its successive periods.

[Question] Unity of action with the CGT [General Confederation of Labor] seems to be going better. On 19 June you met with this organization which, you said, you consider to be your "most important partner," at the same time announcing your desire to recreate the largest possible trade union front. How are your relations with the other groups of trade unions?

[Answer] During our interview with the CGT we did not conceal from it the fact that our profound differences--on the major political and ideological orientations, the concept of the trade union or the notion of class--did not make it possible to place our relations in a privileged ideological relationship. But we also told the CGT that, in its numeric weight and its presence in the enterprises, it effectively remained our most important partner. Henri Krasucki, we noted with pleasure, was in perfect agreement with our way of seeing things. The ground is thus clear for an agreement on definite and pinpointed problems. At least in words. There again, unfortunately, the CGT's successive veering does not permit our complete understanding. And by emphasizing the grave inadequacies of Francois Mitterrand's options, Georges Seguy's recent declarations give one to think that if the PC were held to the duty of discretion by "governmental solidarity," the CGT would appear to be the Communist Party's critical voice. We remain optimistic, however: our manner of acting as an independant force bent on successful change is the best means of avoiding the CGT's return to a phase of isolation and agressiveness.

All the more so since the moment encourages good intertrade union relations. The CFDT, in any event, is seeking to establish relations of the same nature with the different organizations. That is to say that it is a question of seeing with each one how to reconcile viewpoints on an objective for common action. We know that the same method will lead to different results depending on with whom we are talking, their weight and their effectiveness. Thus, we are adopting a pragmatic, effective approach calculated to create better intertrade union relations little by little. And to promote the autonomy of trade unionism with respect to policy.

[Question] To conclude, I would like you to respond to a more personal question. You have been a trade unionist for nearly 25 years. Have you ever lived through so optimistic a period?

[Answer] Yes. As a time I would say that May '68 had more intense dynamics of creativity and hope. On the other hand, the fragility of the ephemeral was felt then. That time, precisely because it was ephemeral, because it could not fulfill the prodigious hope with which it was laden, represents a very rich experience for the present period: an experience which helps us to combine the desire for renewal and change in social relations with the wise, calm approach of quiet hope that dominates today.

In fact, I do not think that these two periods are comparable. May '68 was a sort of acute surge, an explosion followed an abrupt fallback. Now, 1981 is a change in slope. And the speed of this new grade is much more conducive, ultimately, to real changes. Because it is a speed that makes it possible to go the distance.

9380

CSO: 3100/847

GOVERNMENT PLANS FOR FINANCING NEW AIRPORT REPORTED

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 19 July 81 p 5

[Text] From the beginning, the building of the airport in Athens was tied to a series of "battles" between those interested directly and indirectly. Thus, after the consideration for the choice of location of the new airport, now a new battle is being waged for the appraisal of the old one.

The manner in which the Ellinikon airport will be sold will be judged by the outcome of the tug of war which involves, on the one side, the inhabitants of the nearby areas who demand as many green areas as possible and, on the other side, the government which is seeking to make as much money as possible in order to finance the Spata project. In an effort to temper these counterbalancing positions, a study for the valuation of Ellinikon was recently assigned to DEPOS [Public Enterprise for Town Planning, Housing and Shelter] with the idea of maintaining the pretense that the negotiations for the sale were taken away from the Athens' Airport because up to now it had given all indications of having the mentality of the real estate owner who seeks to derive the largest possible financial profit from "his" property.

Based on past experience in similar situations of such estimates involving the government and private citizens, there is little reason to be optimistic about the fate of Ellinikon. There is though, especially in this last "battle" an unforeseen factor which can overturn the monotonous tradition of decades and that is the upcoming elections ...

The new International Airport of Athens is already under construction in Spata, without anyone of those who had an opposing view as to the choice of its location, having been persuaded as to why this unique solution was preferred.

Surely now days, when bulldozers clear land where a few years hence aircraft will be landing, do not lend themselves to a dialogue regarding the criteria on the basis of which the government decided to construct this gigantic project. However, as the critical study of the Technical Chamber almost prophetically pointed out in March 1976, before Spata was chosen, the most important criterion for choosing the location of the airport is the social and economic impact on the area, "elements which cannot be measured, or only measured politically."

In the meantime, this political choice has not stopped having other significant consequences whose effects will become apparent to everyone very soon. Already, while construction is essentially in the preparatory stage of earthmoving, official estimates raise the cost of the construction of the airport to at least 50 billion drachmai (at 1981 prices, from which it is believed there will be a cost overrun), a sum three times that anticipated three years ago (18 billion in July 1978) based on the bill which proposed the constitution of the "Athens Airport" Corporation, to which the study, construction, organization, operation, administration, return on capital investment and development of the new Athens airport was assigned.

In order to perceive the magnitude of the project, not only by Greek standards, it is sufficient to mention two facts:

Two and one-half billion drachmai alone were necessary for drawing up the new airport's "Master Plan" which was initially assigned to a cooperative of researchers headed by the "Aéroport de Paris" and later, by the Dutch NACO, which totally revised the previous study by adding new data regarding the traffic flow of aircraft at the new airport.

The initial estimate for the earthmoving work has reached seven billion drachmai. The project was assigned, after two requests for bids (unexpectedly the first was completely invalidated by the Economic Committee, which accepted a memorandum of technical companies whose bids had been rejected), to the Mikhaniki AE [Mechanical Corporation] and Koinopraxia Elliniki Tekhniki [Greek Cooperative Craft] which is composed of the following companies: XEKTE, Proodeftiki and Skapanefs. One more contract, mainly involving sand and gravel, was assigned to MOMA [Joint Reconstruction Equipment Units].

The dimensions in time and finances of the project of the new airport are eloquently shown by the fact that earthmoving constitutes one of 40 "on location" jobs which will be carried out within a strictly defined time frame in order to ensure not only unhindered construction, but also regularity for its financing.

On their part, the officials in charge are optimistic about staying within the timetable which has been established for the completion of the project. Despite the fact that they do not ignore the importance of having unhindered and timely financing, they also need perfect coordination in the efforts of the principals and sponsors so that the construction of the airport will not meet the fate of almost every major Greek technical project; the officials hope that they will be able -- provided that regular financing is maintained -- to avoid the delays, problems, slowdowns, and obstructionism which constitute an inseparable part of the building tradition of Greek public works.

The interview given to VIMA by the president of the Athens Airport, Mr. Aristeidis Papthanos, is illustrative.

[Question] Based on your experience up to now on the pace of the progress of the different phases of construction, do you continue to hope that the new airport will be ready in 1986? If not, when do you believe it will be completed?

[Answer] Progress of the research and construction work at the new airport is satisfactory within the initial program. The earthmoving operations, which are at a critical point, began on time on 30 March 1981 and the general construction of the foundations of the buildings and installations is scheduled to begin in August, 1982. The general plan for the completion of research and construction is being followed and complied with punctually and there does not appear to be any delay which might lead to a postponement of the opening for operation of the airport, which is scheduled for 1987.

[Question] Estimated at today's prices, which are based solely on the Master Plan and on some preliminary studies, do you have a clear picture of the total cost of the project?

[Answer] The cost estimates are not based solely on the Master Plan and on some studies, but on the entire preliminary studies of the on-location construction phases of the new airport. At this stage, the corporation has a very clear picture of the total amount of investment, which will reach one billion, one hundred million dollars, based on prices as of May 1981.

[Question] The EKhPA [Civil Aviation Pilots Association] for years had doubts about Spata because of the peculiar topography of the area, which creates great turbulence and crosswinds in the approach area. Have you asked the Air Force to perform tests regarding this problem? And if so,

a. Is it true that long-term measurements with automatic data-recording instruments, which the Air Force does not have, are necessary and, therefore, any conclusion will again be based only on the experience of the pilots?

b. Why have you begun construction before an answer, even if not scientifically proven, was given on the subject?

c. What will happen if research proves the fears of the EKhPA [Civil Aviation Pilots Association] to be true?

[Answer] On the subject of the existence or non-existence of air turbulence in the area, it was not possible that it alone would determine whether the construction of the new airport took place and this was because:

a. The topography of the area, in combination with the prevailing winds with regard to direction and velocity do not create situations of turbulence which would justify the interruption of flights at the airport for even a few hours per year.

b. Nowhere in the world are there taken into consideration as factors for

the construction of an airport the probabilities of turbulence for a duration of a few hours per year, and even less so under certain conditions of wind velocity (a fairly common thing), but what is taken into consideration is the overall prevailing weather conditions (visibility, cloud ceiling, winds), which were studied before the decision was made to build the airport in the area.

c. The prevailing weather conditions, not only in the area of the airport, but more generally in Attiki, are ideal, and it is not believed that, for whatever reason, they would be any more different than those prevailing at the airport of Ellinikon.

As a matter of fact, the Air Force was asked to conduct tests for the duration of different conditions of wind velocity so that they would have a clear picture of the situation. This though was done within the framework of the overall effort of the A/A [Athens Airport] to cover all the areas of concern, in addition to its readiness during the beginning of operations at the new airport.

In the same way, the A/A [Athens Airport] is proceeding with the study concerning winds, visibility, cloud cover, rainfall, etc. in cooperation with the National Meteorological Service for the verification of these factors. For this reason, on the other hand, the EMY [National Meteorological Service] has placed an automatic data-gathering instrument for measuring wind velocity and direction.

What Will Become of Ellinikon?

[Question] Do you believe that the expense could be met by the sale (and up to what point) of Ellinikon and loans such as those anticipated in the old Management Study? What are the guidelines of the study which DEPOS [Public Enterprise for Town Planning, Housing, and Shelter] will prepare to appraise Ellinikon Airport?

[Answer] The guidelines of the study which will be prepared by DEPOS [Public Enterprise for Town Planning, Housing, and Shelter] for the appraisal of Ellinikon are:

- a. The well-regulated integration of the area of Ellinikon into the urban development of Athens on an urban and suburban level. The study will move within the framework defined by the Regulatory Plan of Athens according to the decision of 6 September 1979 of the National Council of Regional Planning and Development and Environment.
- b. The improvement in financial proceeds from the remaining area in order to finance the construction of the new airport.
- c. The control of the effects on the environment and the extent of the development of the area and, more generally, on the Athens basin.

It is believed that the sale of Ellinikon will offset, if not in its entirety, the major portion of the expense for the construction of the new airport and this because there will be no financial gain from the sale of the entire area because a major portion will be set aside for the operational and other needs of the surrounding district.

The generalities with which the guidelines of the study for the sale of Ellinikon are expressed cover (and in a fairly clumsy manner) the main question on the subject: the portion of the old airport which will be divided into lots in relation to the space which will be the "breathing area" of the parks which the government has promised to build in the area.

Based on the first cost estimates of the Spata airport, the sale of one section of Ellinikon would be sufficient to cover the expense of building the new airport. But with today's data, it is extremely doubtful whether the sale of the entire old airport would be sufficient to finance the building of the new one.

The obstacles which DEPOS [Public Enterprise for Town Planning, Housing, and Shelter] will have to face in preparing the study for the appraisal of Ellinikon stem from the Regulatory Plan of the department and they are veritable shackles only as concerns the common use areas which are anticipated in this plan. In all the other sectors of the valuation of the old airport, the Regulatory Plan is more of a "prayer book" and less a framework within which any study will necessarily be integrated.

The intentions for the sale of Ellinikon which approach the limits of an actual sell-out became manifest early on. The preliminary study for the future use of the space of the old airport, which was prepared by the Cooperative of researchers of the Master Plan for Spata sets forth concrete objectives: dividing into lots, by stages, of approximately 3,000 stremmas [square kilometers] with the most probable purchasers being large hotel conglomerates and a few wealthy, private citizens who would like to own, at a short distance from Athens, luxury homes for permanent residence or simply for summer vacations. The same preliminary study also devised a plan for the sale of a section of the area of Ellinikon prior to the ceasing of operations at the airport and concurrently with the beginning of construction at Spata.

The proposals of this preliminary study, which are not binding for the ultimate researcher, but are very favorable to the financing of the new airport (so that it would require great courage on the part of the government to ignore them) are concrete: the selling off of the land can begin with the northeastern sector of Ellinikon, in other words, the area used by the United States Air Force, which is located outside the approach paths to the airport, a fact which, according to the researchers, will permit housing construction even before the closing of the airport. It involves 700 stremmas [square kilometers] where residences and office and light industry buildings can be constructed.

In the following phase, the sale of 2,000 additional stremmas [square kilometers], part of which is located along the length of the coastal avenue (suitable for hotel units, other tourist establishments, and luxury residences) while the other part is located northeast, between the taxiways of the airport, the American base, and Alimos (suitable for residences, offices, and hotels).

Parcelling before the Revision

The unique part of the proposal is the idea of investigating whether the parcelling of these sections can be accomplished before operations at the airport cease, especially because the purchasers of these sections will be unable to use them before the actual closing down of the airport, the idea being whether the purchasers could be compensated in the form of interest.

Certainly the preliminary study does not define a set manner for the sale of this area, a matter which does not fall within its jurisdiction. In any event, such "details" as to how the section will be sold, as lots to private citizens or in larger parcels to Greek and foreign investment companies or even in its entirety to a cooperative of banks, is expected to be studied by DEPOS [Public Enterprise for Town Planning, Housing, and Shelter].

The sections of Ellinikon "to be saved," according to the same researchers, are today's areas of aircraft maneuvering (taxiways, parking aprons) where a green area will be created, and be connected to the existing golf course and the building of the eastern air terminal (foreign flights), which will be utilized as the administrative center, exposition area, sports center, shopping, etc.

With this "solution," the tourist complexes of the coastal zone will be located between the ocean and the green areas, while the "green breathing space" will be between the concrete of the high-rise buildings to be erected.

But even if, with this proposal, roughly half of the area of the old airport were to be "saved" (including the air terminal) from being divided into lots -- an area which is too small to satisfy the requests made by the 570,000 residents of the surrounding areas to the local self-government through their representatives -- there is no guarantee that this portion will remain unchanged until the end. The preliminary study of the cooperative estimates that with the sale of 50 percent of Ellinikon, a capital of 25 billion drachmai is assured, which naturally is not sufficient to cover the new cost of the Spata airport, even if the researcher has made his calculations with the low unit figures.

In order to verify the "marriage" of this preliminary study to the regulatory plan of district No. 8, it suffices to mention that for the Ellinikon area, by the year 2000, there would be suitably located within the urban network an aggregate of 9,000 stremmas [square kilometers], preferably for

use as "handicraft" parks for low or no-nuisance industries. On the other hand, at Ellinikon, with a projected increase in population up to 720,000, there is about to be created the center of one of the nine districts of the capital. For all these inhabitants of the area who will be free from the noise and emission pollution of the airplanes, the old, known, unaltered intuition about "valuation" will not allow them to obtain spaces for parks, sports, and political rallies -- elements generally indispensable, but pressingly needed for a tragically, undervalued environment.

The reception given by the government to the preliminary study for the sale of Ellinikon was, as expected, wholehearted. On 31 January 1980, the minister of communications addressed an exceptionally urgent message to the Urban Development Directorate (now Ministry of Regional and Urban Planning, Development, and Environment), in which he points out the following:

"... in the preparation of the study of the greater District No. 8 (S.S. of Ellinikon) which includes the area of the airport, it should be brought to the attention of the researcher that, after the general regional development principles have been defined for the entire District No. 8, the district of the airport will be cut off and will be the subject of a special study with the aim of converting it into profit for the benefit of the Athens Airport as this is projected in Law 811/78."

This has to do with the official confirmation of the small lot-owner mentality, which has been carried to the level of the government. Thus, whatever methods may be used to prepare the final study for the sale of the area, and to whomever its preparation is assigned, the danger of a sell-out of the greater portion of Ellinikon continues to exist. In the end there is no guarantee that the change of officials in high places has brought any change in the general designs of the government.

9731

CSO: 4621/50

BUDGET DEFICIT FOR 1980-1981 RISES TO 61 BILLION KRONOR

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 5 Jul 81 p 25

[Article by Karl Ahlenius: "The Government went back 61 Billion"]

[Text] The deficit in the government's budget for the fiscal year 1980/81 was 61 billion kronor--or approximately 4 billion more than what the government had expected. The budget deficit has in one year increased by 8.2 billion kronor or by 16 percent as compared to the 1979/80 deficit of 52.8 billion.

This is shown in the monthly report for June from the national debt office.

"It is only deplorable that we have a somewhat greater deficit than we had expected," says Minister of Economics and Budgets Rolf Wirtén (fp) in a comment to DAGENS NYHETER.

"It further emphasizes the importance of our continuing the line we started in pushing the expense side in the national budget back in order thus to keep down the balance in the budget."

In parallel with--and as a consequence of--the increase in the budget deficit, the Swedish national debt increased during the fiscal year 1980/81 by 60.9 billion or 32 percent.

On the last day in June Sweden's national debt was 253 billion kronor compared with 192.1 twelve months ago.

The foreign debts have increased from 32.1 to 46.7 billion kronor or by 45 percent. Between the fiscal years 77/79 [sic] and 78/79 the national debt increased by 33.8 billion kroner and from 78/79 to 79/80 by 53 billion--and now, during 80/81, there is thus an increase of 60.9 billion kronor.

This means that the Swedish national debt during the last three fiscal years increased by a total of close to 150 billion kronor.

Of the present state debt of 253 billion kronor, 46.7 billion or 18 percent is thus foreign loans.

Corresponding figures at the end of June and beginning of July 1980 were: total national debt 192.1 billion, of which foreign loans 32.1 billion or 17 percent.

This means that while the total national debt increased by 32 percent during the fiscal year, Sweden's foreign debt has increased by 45 percent (from 32.1 to 46.7 billion kronor).

The national borrowing has for the same time increased by "only" 29 percent (from 160 billion to 206.2 billion).

8958

CS0: 3109/218

OZAL SEES IMF TALKS AT TURNING POINT

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 10 Jul 81 p 5

[Report by Yildirim Polat in Washington on Deputy Prime Minister Turgut Ozal's talks with IMF officials]

[Text] Washington, 10 July--ANATOLIAN NEWS AGENCY--Minister of State and Deputy Prime Minister Turgut Ozal, in Washington for talks with officials of the IMF, said that, "the efforts expended by Turkey towards putting its economy in order are greater than the assistance received from abroad." Ozal, who also met with World Bank President Tom Clausen, made it clear that there are statements that Turkey can make with confidence in these negotiations, namely that there has been progress in exports, that worker remittances of foreign currency have increased, that the rate of inflation has decreased, and that there are new tax laws. Ozal also met with representatives of Citibank in Washington.

In a statement issued in connection with the talks held on the occasion of the conclusion of the first year of the three-year accord with the IMF, talks which will be concluded at the end of this week, Ozal said: "Nevertheless in one place our weakness continues, and appears likely to continue further, and that is the State Economic Enterprises. I state this openly."

While noting that there had been improvement in the State Economic Enterprises [SEE] as compared to last year, Ozal said that this was not sufficient. Explaining that this sector, barring some exceptions, had deteriorated on its own, Ozal said that there are different opinions on this matter and that a full conclusion has not yet been reached. Ozal stated: "I have also said the same thing to the president of the World Bank. You are welcome to investigate it, is there anything you can tell us? This is not an easy matter."

He also said that at the present time the SEE constitute a burden to the Turkish economy and that the solution would take time. The deputy prime minister also noted that it would become clear at the conclusion of the talks whether or not there are divergent views in relations with the IMF.

Ozal, who pointed out that in his talks with the IMF conditions for the upcoming year had also been examined, said that this would constitute an important turning point in the accord.

Ozal continued his remarks as follows: "The areas in which Turkey has achieved positive results in one year's time are the decrease in the rate of inflation from 100 percent to 35 percent, and the increase of hard currency revenues. This year we are seeing an increase in excess of our estimates. For the first time, exports have grown by 28 to 29 percent. This year our debt service obligation is \$2.2 billion. From the point of view of Turkey's debt service obligation, this year shows a drop, as compared to the last three years, from around 55 percent to under 30 per cent. Next year this will drop to 23-24 percent. This would mean a reasonable level. At this time Turkey has foreign construction contracts worth over \$7 billion. This figure at the beginning of 1980 was less than \$2 billion."

Responding to a question asking "whether or not bank interest rates would continue at 50 percent," Ozal replied: "The answer to this question is not easy, since this has not yet been tried in Turkey. I have also discussed this with the president of the World Bank, and one of the most important reforms is a lifting of restrictions on interest rates. That means that interest has begun to be set by the laws of economics. This is one of the most important of the reforms enacted in July last year."

9620

CSO: 4654/93

EEC SEEN DELAYING TURKEY'S FULL MEMBERSHIP

Istanbul GUNAYDIN in Turkish 11 Jul 81 p 5

[Analysis of remarks made by top EEC officials Emile Noel, Gaston Thorn, and Haferkamp to a visiting delegation of Turkish businessmen; date and place not given]

[Text] "The unemployed of Denmark have booked up all of the tourist spots on the island of Majorca for three months." This news, told in a jesting manner, was passed on to Turkish businessmen paying a visit to high-level EEC officials like Emile Noel, Gaston Thorn, and Haferkamp last week. The Turkish businessmen were carrying a letter which can be summarized as follows. "The association agreement has not brought about the needed results. As soon as Turkey completes the transition to democracy, we are ready for full membership. We are also ready to face all difficulties brought on by full membership." As discussions continued, the businessmen began to understand why they had been told this news, delivered in a jesting manner.

The fact of the matter is that, as Turkey begins to press her position favoring full membership, the masks are coming off in the Common Market. The EEC, which in years past has treated Turkey as a stepchild with the excuse that parties opposed to the Common Market were represented in Turkey's coalition governments, now is attempting to put us off with excuses, by saying: "first you should complete the transition to democracy, then you should come."

'Let That Time Arrive, Then We Will Think About It'

In fact, when the Turkish businessmen asked the Commission's Assistant Chairman Haferkamp: "Once we have completed the transition to democracy, what will your position be regarding our application for full membership," he confined himself to the following answer: "Let that time arrive, then we will think about it." When Turkey's full membership was placed on the agenda in a serious manner, the EEC officials brought up the example of the unemployed of Denmark, mentioning the large social expenditures expended on the unemployed and the worsening economic situation. In short, they are telling us the following: "The expansion of the EEC beyond six members has created monumental handicaps. The admission of each new country to membership has added new problems. We cannot overcome this."

The EEC Is Always Complaining

When full membership comes up on the agenda, EEC officials insistently state that the EEC's foreign trade deficit has reached \$60 billion. However at the same time they pretend not to notice that in eighteen years passed under the association agreement Turkey has accumulated a \$10 billion deficit in trade with the member countries.

Finally, the fact that assistance within the framework of the \$650 million fourth fiscal protocol was not approved by the EEC's Council of Ministers but was postponed until November, added to the fact that Commission Chairman Gaston Thorn, when he was confronted with this development, said: "I want Ankara to know that we are at a crucial turning point," shows clearly that the masks are now coming off.

9620

CSO: 4654/93

COMMERCIAL STATISTICS FOR 1980 PUBLISHED

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 13 Jun 81 p 9

[Text] ECONOMIC SERVICE -- The domestic market was more attractive for Turkish exporters in 1980 than exporting.

The 1981 annual economic program released recently revealed the final figures of Turkey's export indexes of foreign trade prices and amounts.

A study of the 1981 statistics shows that Turkish exports had a real rise of only 1.2 percent.

Moreover, prices of goods which Turkey exported rose 50 percent (in Turkish liras) within 1 year. World price increases were responsible for 17.18 percent of this 50 percent price rise, while 32 percent resulted from the rise in value of the dollar against the Turkish lira.

As opposed to a 50 percent price hike in Turkey's export products, 1980 price increases on the home market, i.e. inflation, was 97.4 percent.

In this situation, exporters made better profits from selling on the home market than from exports, with the real rise in exports being only 1.2 percent. Export performance was affected by such factors as inadequate production for various reasons for part of 1980, expectations about the continuity and future of the new economic policies and the need for a period of adjustment to these policies. Exports increased in the final months of the year, however, as a result of the stabilization measures, incentives designed to improve exports, declining sales on the home market and reduced demand.

At present, inflation's drop to 32 percent and the downward trend of prices on the domestic market for the months ahead are making a turn to the outside unavoidable for exporters. Moreover, authorities are reaching the conclusion that export incentives were inadequate and further efforts are expected to have a positive effect on exports in 1981.

SPO ESTIMATES EXPORTS MAY REACH \$5 BILLION IN 1981

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 15 Jun 81 p 3

[Text] Ankara (TURKISH NEWS AGENCY) -- The State Planning Organization [SPO] announced that total exports for 1981 will reach \$5 billion with the export spurts expected in the final months of the year.

A report prepared by the SPO Office of Encouragement Implementation states that "immediately after the 24 January decisions, a significant spurt occurred in the exportation of agricultural products, while vitality began to be seen in industrial products as of September 1980 after a period of preparation." "It may be said that our 1981 export figures may reach \$4.2 billion if these increases are sustained and \$5 billion if the figures expected in agricultural exports are realized this year," it says.

Incentives

The Encouragement Implementation Office's activity report for January-April also notes that in the first 4 months of 1981, export contracts worth \$1.2 million were received as the result of various credits and incentives offered for the purpose of increasing exports and that exports of industrial products amounting to \$830 million are expected in the October-December quarter.

The report reveals that credits totalling 78.2 billion liras were given to exporters during the period, 34.7 billion liras of which came from the "selective credit fund and the 10.4 billion-lira export incentive fund," with 33.1 billion liras consisting of "credit for exports without encouragement certificates" given by the Central Bank.

Indicating that 60 percent of the credits given had been used by May, the report states that fulfillment of export contracts will begin as of September and continues as follows:

"Considering that all of the selective credits and approximately 50 percent of the export credits without certificate are for finished industrial products, total exports of finished industrial products in the last 3 months of the year are expected to bring in a total of \$830 million."

According to Sonmez

Bursa (ANATOLIAN AGENCY) -- Bursa Chamber of Commerce and Industry Executive Board Chairman Ali Osman Sonmez contends that EEC membership must lead the efforts being made for increased exports and says that Turkey will increase its exports 100 percent if the partnership is realized.

Sonmez spoke as follows on this topic:

"Turkey's inclusion among the nations in which foreign investors invest will come about only when Turkey becomes a full EEC member. In past years, governments of the time were unable to give guarantees to foreign companies that wanted to invest in Turkey.

"This has also kept foreign capital out of Turkey. If Turkey were a full member of the EEC, this membership would be a major guarantee for investments. In such a case, Turkey's exports would register a 100 percent increase."

8349

CSO: 4654/55

RETURN OF NATIONALIZED MINES TO FORMER OWNERS PROPOSED

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 12 Jun 81 p 9

[Article by Nazmi Bilgin]

[Text] Ankara -- The Energy and Natural Resources Ministry has sent its draft law on operation of coal, boron and iron mines to the Council of Ministers three times.

The draft envisages returning certain mines which were nationalized earlier to their former owners under specified conditions. Of the coal mines turned over by the draft, 60 coal and asphaltite mines which would supply thermal power plants are left under the Turkish Coal Works Enterprise [TKI]. There is also a provision for the establishment of a "Boron Minerals and Products Export Board," for the development of export strategy.

Production Drop

The draft rationale notes that production at the nationalized mines has declined and that procedures were able to be completed at only 820 of the nearly 9,000 coal, boron and iron mines.

Changes Introduced

If the draft law on operation of coal, boron and iron mines is passed verbatim, the law nationalizing the mines will be rescinded. All mines except the coal and asphaltite mines operated by the TKI will come under the mines law.

Articles in the law place priority on returning the mines removed from state operation to their former rightful owners through application to the Energy and Natural Resources Ministry within 1 month of promulgation of the law and compliance with conditions to be set forth in communiques based on the law, and completion of these procedures is envisaged within 3 months.

The draft disallows any claim by former rightful owners to losses, damages or compensation during reinstatement, requires assumption of all rights of workers employed at the mine arising from labor laws and collective agreements and also requires the competent authorities to abandon any suits brought against the ministry.

The draft notes that for mines returned to their former rightful owners, payments and compensation made to them will be paid to the organization concerned by the rightful owners in eight equal installments spread over 3 years with a 1-year grace period.

The 17-article draft states that mines operating by concession or permit will continue to operate during the turnover procedures, that stocks on hand on the turnover date will belong to the organization and that the rightful owner will assume obligations arising from contracts concluded by third parties in connection with the mine.

Production Amounts

The draft also contains regulations to encourage and require production at the returned mines, saying, "For a period of 1 year, production is to equal at least the annual amount of the year prior to takeover by the organization concerned."

Nonreturned Mines

The draft charges the Energy and Natural Resources Ministry with preparing the directive setting the manner and conditions of return and notes that the mines needed to cover the thermal stations' coal requirements and asphaltite mines will be run by the TKI. There is also a provision allowing these mines to be run in partnership with the private sector.

There are 60 coal and asphaltite mines which will be used by the TKI for the thermal stations' needs and which will not be returned, 32 of which are in Siirt, 7 in Mugla, 7 in Manisa, 4 in Bursa, 3 in Ankara, 2 each in Konya and Mardin and 1 each in Kutahya, Sivas and Erzurum.

8349

CSO: 4654/55

PERSONALITY SKETCH OF BUSINESSMAN BAHATTIN GOREN

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 11 Jul 81 p 2

[Interview with Bahattin Goren, owner and board chairman of Insaat Sirketi A. S.]

[Text] In a survey by the engineering journal CONSTRUCTION WEEK AND ENGINEERING VIEWS AND RECORDS, two Turkish firms have succeeded in entering the ranks of the world's largest companies. One of the firms mentioned is the firm of Fevzi Akkaya and Sezai Turkes, who have gained deserved fame for representing Turkish power and culture in Libya. The other one is the firm of Bahattin Goren, who has earned the same fame by successfully bidding for contracts in Iraq, and who is our guest for this week.

"I was born in Anadolu Kavagi in Istanbul. After finishing elementary and middle school in Anadolu Kavagi, I embarked upon my high school years at the Kabatas High School for Boys. I completed my higher education at the faculty of civil engineering at Istanbul Technical University. Although I was a good student, I was quite mischievous in my younger years. Following my graduation from the faculty, I immediately entered working life.

"My first job was a civil service position in the highway department. I worked as an engineer on some construction projects in Erzurum and Unye. After a while, I made up my mind to establish my own business. That means I became a contractor. My first contracting venture began with bridge construction.

"We started out with small construction jobs. Our first job was the 95 meter long Kocacay bridge in the town of Cide on the Black Sea coast. When I began construction on the Isparta tunnel in 1968, the money in my pocket amounted to just 3000 liras. In spite of this, I bought five trucks on time payment and, with a speed that one could call a record, I managed to finish this 4 km long tunnel in 22 months. At the time I was so alone that I had no one to assist me. I understood that if one wants to get something done, one has to go and do it oneself. Just idle talk, I believe, will never get results. I used to come to Istanbul in the morning, load up the necessary supplies, and set off for Isparta in the evening. Then as soon as I got to Isparta, I would start working on the night shift. I used to work not knowing whether it was daytime or night. I had an incredible capacity for work.

"It used to happen that I would work for several days continuously without sleeping. I still maintain that pace for working. Of course over time we have grown, and now I have aides and trusted staff members to assist in the necessary departments. But in all my work and in my success my greatest helper has been my partner Nizamettin Goren, who is also my brother. Even though he is a graduate of the faculty of law, he hasn't found the time to practice his profession as an attorney because of his help to me. He came to work at my side as soon as he graduated from the faculty. We are still together today. He is my greatest support in my business life.

My Own Record

"While required to complete construction on the Opera bridge project in 22 months, I completed it in eight months and thereby, as I see it, broke a record. My motto is 'speed.' I am in favor of finishing every job fast, a moment sooner if I can help it. That means I have a philosophy of life that says, not 'don't leave until tomorrow what you can do today,' but 'finish today's work a day earlier.' The projects that I have completed and handed over before deadline are the ones that I like the best and identify with the most.

"Struggling under very difficult conditions, we have managed to complete 88 percent of the Izmit Expressway, the largest contract ever awarded by the department of highways, including the suspension bridge.

"The crisis in the construction sector affected us greatly at first. We surmounted this within our own structure, easing our financial problems and even eliminating them.

"We made other investments in various fields. I am spending 1981 in consolidating my businesses. For 1982 I am planning investments that will bring even more hard currency into our country and open up new job opportunities.

Our Subsidiaries

"At the ESG (Computer Operations Center) we have two separate computers, each with a capacity of 256K bytes. Among the plans we have for using these extremely high-capacity machines are, first of all, bringing order to Istanbul's traffic administration (by putting it on microfiche), reorganizing Istanbul's assigned accounts receivable market (by putting it on microfiche), and entering into cooperation with the EEC's data bank.

"Since Turkey is surrounded by the sea on three sides, and because of my great love for the sea, and since I believe that Turkey's future lies in the sea, my greatest dream since childhood has been to have my own dockyard. Kiyi Gemi Insaati A. S. is the fruit of these dreams of mine. We have succeeded in establishing the largest and most modern dockyard in Turkey at this time. This dockyard, worth 3-4 billion liras, still has a few small imperfections. It is my hope that these, too, will be remedied in a very short time. Our dockyard is located near Degirmencik village in the district of Biga.

"The Kiyi dockyard is an establishment located on a property of 30,000 square meters with 15,000 square meters of enclosed manufacturing and assembly workshops, with

modern administrative and technical offices, and it has the capability of building ships up to 40,000 deadweight tons in size. The Kiyi dockyard is a complete complex, having both technical and social facilities. At the present time we are having yet another ship built for our own use.

"I want these difficulties to be resolved as soon as possible. My whole desire is to be useful to my country. At every stage of my life I have engaged in struggle. I know that no one has struggled as much as I have in order to achieve success in life. I believe that even without outside aid I will overcome the difficulties here as well, and I have faith that we will make our dockyard the most powerful dockyard in Turkey.

"At Biga we are in the midst of efforts to found the largest electric motor factory in Turkey on 700 donums of land, with its feasibility study already finished, its government certificate for industrial incentives in hand, and the know-how agreement completed. This is a factory requiring no hard currency whatsoever. I am proud to say that this investment of ours will soon be completed and ready to begin its production.

Expanding Abroad

"When we saw our country's need for hard currency, we took the decision to expand abroad. We took the hard way and went to Iraq. Iraq was the most difficult place for obtaining bank performance guarantee bonds. We like difficulty and struggle, we even prefer it... We operated for three years as the sole Turkish contractor in Iraq. The first project we undertook in Iraq in 1977 involved construction for irrigation projects. We worked like missionaries in that country. At the present time we are continuing work on a 270 million dollar project in Iraq.

"The latest is our success in obtaining a contract to build a large bypass highway near Baghdad, in spite of competition from other Western firms. Right now we are beginning construction on two expressways and overpasses. Contrary to assumptions current in some circles, there is never any question of bribery or manipulating people in Iraq. Success is the only way.

"In matters of business I am very courageous and aggressive. We now have offices in Saudi Arabia and Libya. In the near future we will also begin working on construction projects in those countries. In Saudi Arabia we successfully bid on a contract, but because we were unable to produce the bank performance guarantee bond in the time required due to the circumstances of that period, we let it slip out of our hands. In those days the performance guarantee bonds issued by Turkish banks were not accepted in Saudi Arabia. Just one month after we lost this contract, Is Bankasi succeeded in getting itself accepted in Saudi Arabia. We were not able to realize the value of this contract award. But we did not give up. In the very near future we will again tender bids on contracts in Saudi Arabia, and I believe we will succeed in obtaining them.

Personality

"I like sports very much, and I have engaged in every field of sport. When I was a student, wrestling was my favorite pastime. To this very day I have not met anyone who can surpass me in swimming.

"In my business affairs the first consideration in everything is speed. In my life as a businessman I started every enterprise at point zero and built it from the bottom up. I had no table, so I ate my meals from the top of a suitcase. We have gotten where we are now by hard climbing. Working honorably, we have achieved success with courage. My character is very sound. I have an endless passion for struggle. That means I prefer difficult tasks to success in easy undertakings. I place great importance on friendships. The friendships I established years ago are the ones I still keep up. My friends are very humble people. I like excursions, entertainment, and travel a lot. A considerable part of my life is passed on business trips. Although I love Istanbul very much, the necessity of pursuing my business affairs frequently forces me to be away from Istanbul. Because of this, I am separated from our beautiful city for long periods of time. This pains me very much.

"My belief in God is endless. I also believe in good luck and destiny.

"I love my country very much. My pleasure at all times is derived from contributing something to my country, from creating some things for it. Thus, rather than making transitory but quick profits, I prefer to occupy myself with enterprises that will be of use to my country or will bring it hard currency."

Our Opinion:

"The actions of a courageous man are the source of inspiration for a timid person."

It is our belief that there have been many who have profited from the courage of Bahattin Goren up to the present time. This businessman of ours, who successfully delivered a project due in 22 months in as short a time as 8 months, is a very fine example for those people who cannot deliver a project by deadline.



Bahattin Goren

NEW DECISION ON WHEAT IMPORTS ADOPTED

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 9 Jul 81 p 1

[Report on the government's decision to grant the Soil Products Office authority to import wheat "as needed," and on business reaction to this decision]

[Text] Following a decision by the Inter-ministry Economic Council in favor of wheat imports, giving the Soil Products Office the authority to import "as much wheat as needed," it is expected that flour prices during the next week will drop by 15 to 20 percent.

According to the authorization granted to the TMO [Soil Products Office], with the aim of preserving the base price on wheat and of preventing stockpiling, the TMO will be able to import between 500,000 and 1.5 million tons of wheat as necessary, in increments of 100,000 tons. However, officials caution that since the wheat harvest is expected to be quite large this year, and the wheat from central Anatolia has not yet been harvested, and following the wheat harvest in central Anatolia the office may also make purchases there, the result may mean a lowering of prices as well as a lowering of the amount to be imported. Officials of flour mills in the Marmara region state that as wheat from Thrace is being harvested right now, they have lowered the prices on some kinds of flour, and that the increase in flour prices some time ago was the result of the exhaustion of flour reserves held by the TMO and the mills, and that flour prices are expected to stabilize shortly. The officials, repeating that this year's harvest is expected to be large, contend that wheat imports will not reach the planned 1.5 million tons.

TARSAM

Ayhan Basdal, general director of TARSAM [Agricultural Industry Products Marketing Corporation], who states that this year's wheat harvest is large, indicated that prices in effect since 15 June will be lowered by 20 percent starting next week. Ayhan Basdal had the following additional comments on the subject of lower flour prices:

"Since wheat prices a while ago were running around 28 to 30 liras, we raised our flour prices starting Monday 15 June. Because wheat production in Turkey varies by region, the first crop comes in from Adana, Urfa, and Thrace, while the harvest that is brought in last comes from central Anatolia. Therefore, from whichever region we have collected the harvest, in that region flour prices fall. The wheat

we use from central Anatolia is only harvested beginning 10 July. Since the harvest will be coming in as late as 20 July, we won't be able to use the harvested grain until that date.

"It is for this reason that, even though prices have fallen by a large percentage, we are still using last year's crop. Because of this it is at the moment impossible for us to lower prices. Only when the harvest from central Anatolia starts to come in and prices throughout Turkey begin to fall will we lower our prices by 15 to 20 percent."

The flour mill operators, who say that this year's harvest will be large and that with the new crop flour of grade 60/65, which until recently sold at 2,600 liras a ton, will sell at 2,000 liras a ton, add the following views regarding this year's wheat harvest, the TMO's authorization to import wheat, and on flour prices:

Flour Mill Operator Ziya Tanik:

"As long as the TMO sells the millers wheat at the base price there is no problem. In just a few years there has been an abnormal increase in prices. Wheat that was selling at 11 liras has gone up to 22 liras. The TMO, and before them the millers, was having problems finding wheat. It is for this reason that we propose that the TMO allocate wheat to the millers in the necessary manner."

Hursit Tunay (Director of the Altinbasak Flour Mill):

"Deficiencies in production are keeping wheat prices at an undesirable level. We are of the opinion that wheat production is lacking. The situation will become clear only after the rate of production of the Konya region is determined. The fall in flour prices is only temporary."

9620

CSO: 4654/93

EUROPEANS INDIFFERENT TO PCF MINISTERS, NEUTRALISTS, APPEASERS

Paris LE FIGARO in French 10 Jul 81 pp 1, 4

[Article by Patrick Wajzman: "Resisting"]

[Text] The Europeans are stricken with a strange malady. A devastating, inexplicable malady that spares neither political leaders, public opinion, nor commentators. A seemingly harmless malady which--I am convinced--will do us all in if we do not do something about it: Indifference.

One actually has the feeling today that it has become entirely natural to accept everything in silence: Communism at home; neutralism among our neighbors; arrogance and trickery from our enemies. It has become natural not to denounce the dangers that are preying upon our Old Continent. Natural not to call attention to the small-scale challenges and the large-scale threats. In short, it has become natural not to resist.

Are we in fact being manipulated, or intoxicated or anesthetized, to behave in this strange manner? Possibly. In any case, what is certain is that if we were, we would be behaving no differently.

But let the reader review with me the press of the last several days and judge for himself or herself.

In France, a public opinion poll has just found that 21 percent of our fellow citizens feel "reassured" by the presence of communist ministers in the government, and that 39 percent of the persons interviewed are totally "indifferent" to it. Which means, assuming these figures are correct, that 60 percent of the French people no longer mistrust Georges Marchais's henchmen. Do we realize the full historic significance of such a revelation?

For the last 60 years, the PCF [French Communist Party] has been one of the most totalitarian and most Sovietized parties on earth. Francois Mitterrand himself made this point not so long ago, with a humorous comment that "Stalinism, like malaria, always returns." Now apparently, 3 short weeks have sufficed for all its blemishes to be swept aside and for a large segment of the French population to suddenly contemplate Mr Fiterman and his friends with complacent detachment.

Since the PCF has obviously not renounced its convictions in 20 days, one must conclude that it is we who have changed; that it is we who no longer have even the will to be vigilant. Is this what one calls resisting?

Let us continue our scanning of the newspapers. We note that the USSR's Embassy in Paris protested violently last week against the TF1 telecast of a documentary concerning "Radio-Kaboul Libre" (an excellent initiative of the Human Rights Commission, in support of the Afghan Maquis).

Here again, who even dreamed of publicly castigating such scandalous interference in our own internal affairs? Who among our august spokesmen was heard to make it clear to the Soviet diplomats that, pending a new order of things, it is not within their province to chaperone French television newsmen? And who, for good measure, pointed out that the Kremlin is rather ill-positioned to assume, in behalf of universal morality, the role of judge of the Afghan people's interests? The answer: No one. We are asleep. We are "taking it lying down." As if none of this is our concern. Is this our way of resisting?

Apathy, however--I repeat--is not a French specialty. Today, all of Europe has stopped resisting. The daily press provides us countless indications of this. Countless disturbing indications which--alas!--no longer rouse us, which shower upon us as raindrops on the sea.

Would we like one or two proofs of this, scooped up from the recent torrent of events?

On 6 July, the head of British diplomacy, Lord Carrington, traveled to Moscow on behalf of the EEC to submit to the Russians a plan for settlement of the Afghan problem. But even before he had set foot on Soviet soil, the TASS AGENCY let it be known that the proposal of the Ten was of absolutely no interest whatever; and the Muscovite newsmen even went so far as to suggest that the British diplomat could have saved the expense of such a useless trip. Why, in these circumstances, did Carrington just the same continue his trip to Moscow? Why did he thus offer the Kremlin the opportunity to inflict, through his person, a resounding slap in the face to the entire Community?

But once again, the humiliation was buried in a heavy silence by the European Foreign Offices. And not a person dared to make a sound simply to indicate that intransigence and boorishness have their limits. Is this then our way of resisting?

Another example: On 2 July, Willy Brandt completed a visit to the USSR. No sooner had he set foot in Bonn than he gushed forth with a flow of euphoriant statements; tried to convince his fellow citizens of the Soviets' good intentions; explained that among those with whom he had talked he had sensed a genuine "desire to negotiate," a "renewed emphasis"; and did not hesitate to state that Leonid Brezhnev "fears for peace in the world." The fact is that when one examines Brandt's statements closely, one finds that the master of the Kremlin said absolutely nothing to him that was new: neither on Poland, nor on Afghanistan, nor on the SS20's.

Why the devil does someone not, once and for all, denounce this extraordinary duplicity? Why does no one dare state openly that the former chancellor--regardless of how prestigious he may be--is more and more being "manipulated" by the Russians? Why does no one point out that his soothing statements are encouraging and justifying the disturbing wave of neutralism that is enveloping Germany? Why, in sum, is it not being put in black and white that for the past several years now Mr Willy Brandt, president of Socialist International, Nobel Peace Prize, has been propounding views that coincide very precisely with those of Moscow and contributing to the anesthetization of the West? Now that would be resisting.

I could continue endlessly citing such facts. But to what end? They all lead inescapably to the same conclusion: We have lost our power to say "No" and await passively the making of History by others in our stead. In drifting from give-and-take toward complacency, from politeness toward comity, from idealism toward woolly dreams, we have lost our inclination to roar. Have the communists come into power in France? We immediately convince ourselves that in the end they will simply leave! Are the neutralists pressing to topple Germany into the enemy camp? We simply stand by calmly, waiting for things to right themselves! Are the Soviets insolently laying their law down to us? We simply send Carrington to the Kremlin for tea!

I would like to see one of our Old World statesmen summon the courage, one bright morning, to interrupt this deadly cycle; renew our faith in our own values; and point out to us that our indifference is a quicksand that is slowly engulfing us. I would like to see a European democratic leader come forth on the scene and finally talk to us, without complexes, of true freedom: Not a freedom meted out like a ration card, dependent upon circumstances; but rather a freedom that is won every day--by the pure power of our will.

9399

CSO: 3100/866

SOCIALIST PARTY'S TOBBACK ON PARLIAMENTARY ISSUES

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 15 Jul 81 pp 36-39

[Report on interview with SP parliamentary party leader Louis Tobback, by Frank de Moor and Johan Struye: "Louis Tobback About One Year of Belgian Politics -- Belgium Is the Exception, Not the SP"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] Friday, 28 August was a radiant summer day, the greatest. The vacation period was coming to an end, but the world still seemed full of promise. Clouds appeared over the rue de la Loi in Brussels only when the press offices distributed HET BELANG VAN LIMBURG. By the time the majority of the people had been made aware, via the television news, of the grand slam Karel van Miert had presented that morning in an interview with that newspaper, a torrential downpour was literally raging over Brussels, the firemen, sirens screaming, were driving out to unclog the sewers, and the president of the Flemish socialists had actually already won his hand. The Martens III administration gave in on the four points of contention with the Flemish socialists: no fuel allowance for the army, no 2.5 percent reduction of civil servant salaries, no more military personnel to Zaire, and no quick decision on the placement of missiles.

Since then, everything has changed. The budgetary figures which were not correct, the three party coalition which did not work, the prime minister who did not turn out to be the right one either, and even the president of the Walloon socialists. A year later, however, the Flemish socialists are still fastened onto the same themes, even though in the meantime the labor agreement, the steel question, the Wijninckx Committee and the budgetary deficit have come roaring by like express trains, which have interfered with the internal balance of larger parties. What is the value of the SP [Socialist Party - Flemish] themes? Louis Tobback believes that they remain singularly consistent in view of the troubles we have to contend with.

Question: Aren't the themes of the presidents of the parliamentary party and of the party itself becoming somewhat worn?

Louis Tobback: You should rather say that we were right too early. When I listen to Nguza Karl I Bond [translator: former prime minister of Zaire] now and I read the better newspapers, then I can find everything there that we have been saying about Zaire for years. The only thing is, of course, that I don't get any royalties.

Question: How did you manage to go so far with the Vanvelthoven resolution? Why did the parliamentary party want to risk the credibility of the Flemish socialists with this?

Tobback: How is that? You could at most reproach us for /not/ [in italics] having brought to a vote a good resolution which we had prepared. There are only 26 of us in the House, out of 212. Should we no longer affirm what we believe we are right in? To reason in terms of losers and winners would be a deadly mentality in parliament. Since the party was established in 1885, there have been at least 10 general labor strikes, at least 10 deaths and no fewer than 25 House elections which we lost, prior to the introduction of universal suffrage.

Question: However, for the first time since 1830, under parliamentary party leader Tobback there is a resolution, introduced by a majority party, not even accepted by parliament for consideration.

Tobback: A parliamentary party introduces a resolution. In this case it involved the fate of 13 Zairian members of parliament, who could not under any circumstances have been the subject of a rule in the government declaration. This was purely parliamentary business, which had nothing to do with either the majority or the minority, or with the executive. Apart from the majority or the opposition, parliament could speak out, as it does for such cases as the banishment of Russian scientists, or the question of exit visas for Jewish people. Normally, we would have expected that the others would not have had any problem with this, but to our utter amazement the CVP [Social Christian Party] -- for the first time since the liberation -- wielded the weapon of non-consideration. In the past it was only used against proposals of amnesty.

Question: It was a deliberate political tactic on the part of the SP to confront the CVP with choices it could not make. So, every time its dissensions were exposed it has surprised us that someone like Tobback did not realize that this time he could not by any means win the point. The CVP closed ranks.

Tobback: The fate of that resolution remains an example. I had never imagined that we would get a majority, because I know the CVP brother. The party would certainly once again have exposed its dissensions. However, I have had to observe that it went to the extreme, in order to avoid voting at any cost on a matter about which it is divided. However, by a strange coincidence a resolution from Gabriels of the People's Union [VU] was considered that very day, which included very offensive language with regard to the South Korean head of state. As far as I am concerned, I found complete satisfaction in this maneuver. We forced the CVP to think things out because we compelled it to seek refuge in the coarsest means in order /not/ [in italics] to have to vote. We have proven that the CVP does not want a bad word to be said about Mobutu.

Question: It is not a question of your being mistaken about Mobutu. The question is that once again the people have noticed that the SP cannot push something out into the open, not even along its most straight-forward route.

Tobback: With regard to Zaire, there is no doubt that we stand alone on this. The PS [Socialist Party - Walloon] is not with us, the CVP is not, and the PSC [Christian Social Party] is not. Yet, the others have become visibly more cautious

when they go to Kinshasa. We are worth only what we are, but how many military advisers would there be in Zaire now if it had not been for us? How much political support would be going to Mobutu in all kinds of ways if it had not been for us?

Question: Aside from the soundness of your objection to Mobutu, with such a sharp point of attack it looks as if you are too easily causing fear in the parlors of the nation. And nothing is more apt to arouse the anger of a certain group than to call for the withholding of the 13th-14th month of family allowance for some or the leveling of high pensions. Isn't this dangerous for a party which could be better off with a doctrinaire backbone?

Drop in the Bucket

Tobback: And yet, for us this proceeds from a homogeneous inspiration. In terms of overall political strategy, it makes sense to show the people that in Kinshasa a gangster clique is fattening itself in the most hideous way possible off the people, who are dying of hunger and are no longer even governed. The same thing applies when I hear Cecil De Strijcker, governor of the National Bank, plead for moderation, but on the other hand see him taking steps to secure his own pension against it.

Question: However, if you draw up Karel van Miert's balance, you don't get very far. At most 300 million francs could be scraped together from the high pensions, while the surrender of the slightest percentage of the salaries of the 864,000 people in the civil service would immediately run into tens of billions of francs. At 250 francs per investigation -- which, incidentally, would be the questionable investigation of means of support -- to figure out who among the more than 3 million children in the country would not be given an allowance, 800 million francs in administrative costs would be spent in order to save 750 million. Are the socialists then going to figure out and determine who will receive free milk during recess, and who will not? With nothing to show for it? Wouldn't it be ideologically more appropriate then to impose overall taxation than to endanger principles? And with your taxation of intermunicipal profits, the treasury would be no more than a half dozen billion francs ahead. Couldn't you find other themes for a change, which would really make it possible to govern the state, for next season?

Tobback: But none of us have ever claimed that we would put the state's finances back on a healthy basis with these themes.

Question: Don't you want to reform them? Is this or is it not a problem faced by Belgian politics? Are you working with fetishes or are the others doing it with their simpleminded goal of a balanced budget?

Tobback: My position is that I can reconstruct the state's finances only -- in other words, that I am asking for the support of the average and even of the small wage earners to this end -- on the condition that those who receive 200,000 francs per month stop with the "you better stay away from me" line "because it doesn't make any sense." If that doesn't produce anything, then the small man with his 20,000 francs would have even more reason to say that withdrawing from him would certainly not make any sense, because his drop in the bucket would produce even less then. The prerequisite that those who are sated be the first to show their support is an essential condition to expecting anything whatsoever from the masses.

After all, you can only ask these people to make an effort if they have the feeling that they are not being cheated. But if they get the disturbing impression anyhow that those whose income is known are being asked to surrender part of it because the country has to be saved, while the governor of the National Bank is being exempted because in his old age, his 500,000 francs per month are referred to as */postponed salary/* [in italics], and because without this prospect he would become depressed, and his creativity would be lost, well, then */nothing/* [in italics] can be done. This is the prerequisite to any action whatsoever, period. Besides, 750 million francs net does not constitute a drop in the bucket either.

Question: It would though, considering this state's expenditures of more than 1,000 billion francs.

Tobback: No, this would already be 1 of the 150 billions which have to be found. All right, if you think that the 13th-14th month does constitute a drop in the bucket, then apparently the CVP does not think so. If I understand them correctly, then no less than the family itself, with its eternal values, is in danger of going under as a result of this drop in the bucket. We are definitely not turning this into a fetish; it is simply the dimension of common sense. To begin with, when there is a general clamoring for income reduction and moderation, then surely someone with 1.5 million francs net taxable income per year should normally not have any difficulty with these crumbs of a 13th or 14th month, should he? However, we are bound to observe that on the contrary they have an incredibly */great deal/* [in italics] of difficulty with them, that in fact nothing is more difficult, and that it would be absolutely the end of all demographic politics. Hence, it cannot be talked about. Thus, if such a drop in the bucket cannot be talked about, what are we going to talk about?

Question: If the SP were ever able to succeed with its major themes, would it then agree to an overall moderation: to hitting the masses from whom alone a receipt of any size can be obtained?

Tobback: Forgive me, but I consider the dogma of overall moderation to be a rightist approach to a problem which is somewhat broader. A number of external circumstances have landed us in our current situation. The increase of energy prices, the shift of some industries to low wage countries in the Third World, the high interest rates in America. The whole question now lies in the resilience of a society to respond to these challenges. Because, as a leftist, I cannot even consider some of these challenges as objectionable. You didn't have to be Jules Verne to have expected 20 years ago that the poor countries would take over a few things. The fact that the price of energy went up, I can only regret to the extent that the profits are going to a few sheiks rather than benefitting the average Saudis. But it was to be expected that the Third World would not forever let its raw materials go at 5 cents per barrel.

Question: Isn't part of the problem the fact that the sheiks are still earning less than our own Grand Vizier of taxes and excises?

Tobback: True. But if you put the question in terms of the resilience of a model of society, then it means precisely that you do not believe that we have suddenly become the victim of a conspiracy against our society. In the last few years, an impoverishment has unmistakably taken place, which will have to be handled. The only problem is whether we will handle this honestly, fairly and justly. In days

of crisis, it looks specifically as if we should shift more from those who have more to those who enjoy less, in order to obtain the net result of zero. This is, somewhat diagrammatically, our approach to the matter. Hence, what I do not accept is that the man with a salary of 200,000 francs proclaims that things have gone to the dogs here because he has been asked to give a hand, and disappears across the border with it.

Question: They are doing it. That is what is happening.

Tobback: If this is widespread, then Belgian society is no longer a society. Then we have become ungovernable. Do not speak any longer about the decadence of the political class then, but about the moral decay of all the haves, of all those who enjoy something. When an American buys a share of stock, he writes his name on it. When he tears off a dividend coupon, he declares it. Those in this country, who take it for granted that this is only done across the borders, have a quarrel with me. I do not take any theft for granted.

No Confidence

Question: Maybe your American declares all his assets because he has an optimistic picture of society, which still has technological and social prospects to offer. Our people only see a state which makes indecent claims and skims off indecently, which pursues motorists and will soon use advertising on its children, in order also to use the screen to raise money. Every day there is less return. One out of every four Belgians already works for the government, but the other four are really not being spoiled in terms of the provision of services. If the management of the social security system alone is to cost more than 50 billion francs, maybe it would be cheaper to put up the sick in Hilton hotels. Heavy taxes are keeping us from smoking, for the benefit of public health, but we should be naturally immune to nuclear power stations. Why don't you conveniently reinstate tolls at all the city gates at the same time, in order to jack up the municipal finances? In these times, shouldn't precisely the defatting of the state, with its baronies of appointments and of profit areas reserved for party politics, which have developed impunity, and with its carefully defined group egoisms, become the priority theme par excellence of a left, which is searching for credibility? Nobody is going to take the Walloon socialists, for whom the good of the working class is risked for a director general, or the Flemish socialists, for whom the tested and tried structures of the savings bank have to go to make space for managers from their own staffs, seriously any longer.

Tobback: The citizens are tired of their political personnel and no longer have any confidence in the government of the state. It is true that Jules Destree and Emile Vandervelde have written against the state, and that there are also a number of people in our party who leave those parts unread. But what has also struck me is that only socialist graduates have to prove their competence; in the CVP, it is apparently taken for granted that their civil servants are competent. The things that we saw being overlooked last year, during a single summer of three party coalition government, by the signatories of the ministers of the liberal parties who are particularly distrustful of the state, were not small in number either. The citizens no longer believe in the functioning of the state machinery, because the tragedy of the country is the fact that the administration is no longer functioning. Why? In the defense sector, the treasury inspectors have for years warned in their report that the budget is being wrenched out of joint, and that

the relationship between personnel, investments and operational costs is being distorted. I might be able to understand that Vanden Boeynants, Desmarets, Poswick and Swaelen may have put this aside. The problem, however, lies in the fact that each time these reports were received from the Ministry of the Budget by a number of state secretaries, ministers and deputy prime ministers, whoever they may have been. What did they say about it in all those staff meetings; who waved his portfolio about? The tragedy lies in the fact that there are only a few dismissed ministers who have angrily asked their party president why they were no longer involved, no longer part of the new administration. If you point the finger at partyocracy, then you don't even have to reproach the party presidents for having authority. The guilty ones are the mandataries themselves who submit to it without a word. If, as a member of parliament, you introduce an amendment against a minister of your own party, then it goes without saying that the next time you will have to fight for your place on the list. But where in the constitution does it say that you cannot do that, that a politician is not allowed to have that kind of courage? The politician's independence is not even involved; there is simply a lack of independence. I know very well that we would become completely ungovernable if there were 90 De Meyers in the Senate. But still, things are not that bad yet. Moreover, I am wondering whether Wilfried Martens, who is said to be so satisfied with his state reform, will still be so a few years from now. I agree with Hugo Schiltz when he says that it is a makeshift job.

The situation has become so intolerable now, that today the CVP, however powerful it may be, is no longer capable of forming a coalition with the liberals, if the PS obtains a majority in the Walloon council elections. An alternative is no longer possible; the majority has been institutionalized. What I learned from last week's noise is that it is not politically proper for one and the same prime minister to govern first with one and then with another coalition. A coalition is a formula you are trying out: an idea, a concept, a method. A consistent statesman does not change formulas like shirts.

Question: But what can you do about it, when you can't even get a resolution against Mobutu through parliament and you just run on about missiles which are going to be stationed anyhow? Not because your 212 colleagues are particularly keen on the Zairian dictator, but because we are doomed to rigid relationships. Isn't NATO equally rigid?

Tobback: Would it be possible that we are really off the mark with single items, with our attack themes? I think precisely not, because those themes at least make it clear that we are not the rule but the exception among the civilized countries of Europe. It is true that in Belgium only the Flemish socialists are concerned about the missiles, and that all the other parties are /not/[in italics]. But take a look across the border. Germany is standing on its head; so are the Netherlands, Norway and Denmark. In France, the assembly has been lying awake for 5 years about defense matters: more nuclear or more conventional? Who now is the misshapen society? Who in Belgium is conducting normal politics, we or the others? If the example of our neighbors demonstrates anything, it is that the missiles are definitely not a single item, but a primary social problem. Since 1979 I have been repeating that the discussion does not concern this or that system of armaments, but rather the basis of the alliance itself. In every other country around us, colonial policy was a problem. In Belgium alone it was not, not even for the socialists. I have to go far back to find a parliamentary question about Congolese policy. We had a minister of colonies who spent his days in complete calm at his

ministry, and simply plodded along. Hence, it seems to me that our themes concerning defense and Zaire are fully within the framework of the necessary structural and financial defatting of the state. What is involved here is the need to take national decision making out of the Brussels drawing rooms, which are also frequented by the CVP, and where they believe that 8 or 10 reasonable heads put together would be better able to make decisions, which nobody then needs to talk about.

Question: Isn't that Willy Claes' belief also?

Tobback: So, I do not agree with it. It suddenly seems to have become Claes' opinion that the political parties are no longer able to cope. Moreover, I also disagree with Willy Claes for the very simple reason that /he/ [in italics] will not be part of it whenever that clique of 20 individuals is formed. /They will not ask him/ [in italics]. Well, the parties have to take their responsibility. I did not go into politics in order to help distribute things during 30 years of abundance. They have taught the Belgians to read and write in their democratized educational system; they are producing high school degrees galore. And now they want to continue to govern those Belgians from that drawing room?

Question: It cannot be assumed that the president of the new socialist power, which France has recently become, will join your small club of Scandinavian and Benelux parties against the missiles. What do you think of Mitterrand?

Tobback: As for Francois Mitterrand, I would say that from his point of view as a nuclear power, he is probably right as far as France is concerned. But this is also the first time that France seems to have concerned itself with our security. If Mitterrand wants to be a good NATO ally, let him take the missiles then. Suggest to him that they be stationed in Charleville-Maisieres; they may even look better there than they would in Kleine Brogel. Besides, Mitterrand is not in a position to interfere in this whole discussion. Nobody has asked him anything, not even the Americans. If he wants to feel involved, then let him reintegrate his army into the alliance. This would automatically eliminate a large part of the imbalance.

8463

CSO: 3105/153

NATO ARMS CRITIC HANSEN TO BE EXPELLED FROM SPD

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 21 July 81 p 1

[DPA article: "Hansen Is To Leave the SPD — Appeal Announced"]

[Text] Duesseldorf, 20 July — Hansen, the opponent of arms modernization and critic of the chancellor, is to leave the SPD. The Lower Rhine Party District Arbitration Commission ordered the Bundestag deputy's expulsion late Monday afternoon in Duesseldorf. The party tribunal came to the conclusion that Hansen had "deliberately and gravely violated one of the party's most important principles, namely solidarity among comrades," thus doing "serious harm" to the SPD. Hansen protested to the Federal Arbitration Commission. He remains a member of the SPD until its decision has been reached. The Young Socialists' Federal Executive Board denounced the district commission's order "with all severity" and declared its solidarity with Hansen.

In February, the Duesseldorf Bundestag deputy had published in the journal KONKRET an article accusing Chancellor Schmidt of "political skulduggery" in connection with the export of submarines to Chile being planned at that time. On 8 May, with reference to NATO's two-track decision, he had talked about a "kind of secret diplomacy directed against our own people"; it was the Arbitration Commission's opinion that he clearly meant the government headed by Schmidt. The commission stressed that its finding did not signify a ban on public and critical disagreement with the policies of the FRG's socialist/liberal government. The ban was rather on a style, one which lacked respect for the opposing view and which was driving a wedge into the party. The commission's verdict affirmed that its task was to pass judgment on the form of criticism, not the content. But with his "conscious and intentional insult," Hansen had been instrumental in creating the public impression that Social-Democratic government policy was directed against the interests of the people.

Hansen's comments to the German Press Agency mentioned a weighty decision for the entire party, one whose effects the Lower Rhine Arbitration Commission was probably fully aware of. He said this was a case of "absolutely honorable, upright Social-Democratic behavior" being punished — "namely, a stubborn insistence on party congress resolutions, on basic values and basic demands."

7458

CSO: 3103/378

CGT-PCF DISAGREEMENTS THREATEN COMMUNISTS' UNITY

Paris LE MATIN in French 8 Jul p 9

[Article by Jean-Pierre Gonguet: "The CGT: First Criticisms of the Government."]

[Text] CGT representatives meeting since yesterday are expected to adopt a more reserved stance on the government's reforms. The CGT's comite confederal national (national confederal committee), which has been in session since yesterday, is expected to adopt a much more critical attitude toward the government today than it did a month ago. The CGT seems, in fact, to feel that it will not recover the members it has lost during the past three years by playing along with the government, but rather by criticizing the timidity of certain socialist reforms. These tactics will be the prerogative of the CGT from now on, as the PCF [French Communist Party] is committed to cooperate with the government and has signed an agreement with the Socialist Party.

"To a certain extent, the present situation is conducive to a forceful reemergence of reformism and the spirit of class cooperation. In these circumstances we certainly intend to be positive, constructive and progressive; but we also mean to strengthen class unionism--which we alone really and truly represent in France." Georges Seguy, on 24 June, once more reminded us that the CGT is a class trade union, the only revolutionary trade union. That is its strength and, according to Georges Seguy, the main axis around which it is built.

That is strategy. Then there are tactics, which can vary as a function of events. After the second round of parliamentary elections, the CGT was exhausted, corroded by internal friction, admittedly having lost at least 250,000 activists from its membership and with financial problems due mainly to the construction of its new headquarters in Montreuil. For some time, many people thought that the CGT would try to "recover its virginity" by playing the game of the new government so as to reap the benefits of the dynamics of unity and build up its membership. The CGT did not enlighten anyone. Its officials merely pointed out, in the corridors at Rue Lafayette, that they would prefer a 20 percent increase in the SMIC (Inter-occupational minimum growth wage). But they issued communiques which were extremely prudent and conciliatory vis-a-vis the government.

Two events modified these tactics. First, like other confederations the CGT realized that the election of Francois Mitterrand did not restore militant

combativeness to workers not members of trade unions, as one might have expected it to do. After making grand declarations about their new strength, trade union officials had to admit that trade union sections are not born as spontaneously as one might wish to believe.

The second event was the agreement between the PCF and the PSF, together with the appointment of communist ministers. Georges Seguy stressed this at the last executive meeting on 24 June. This agreement, which was facilitated by tactical considerations, does not commit the CGT in any way. The PCF has of course renounced some of its major orientations, in particular in foreign policy. But it is not the CGT that signed a text calling for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and a smaller increase in the SMIC. Suddenly, the CGT, which is not committed to any cooperation with the government, finds itself the repository of orthodoxy, and for the past few days it has not failed to make this known.

Two members of the executive committee have been particularly loquacious in this connection: Henri Krasucki and Andre Sainjon. The former, who is negotiating a reduction of the length of the working week, never misses a chance to explain that employers are not trying to adapt to the new social order. As for Andre Sainjon, he managed in one week to condemn the new social contract of the steel industry, price increases for gas and electricity, and higher rents. He has already begun to denounce the coming increase in the price of gasoline and is probably getting ready, as the CGT metallurgical workers' spokesman, to violently attack the government about nationalization (CGT metallurgy has a much broader program, if only with Peugeot, IBM, and Philips and [calling for] the nationalization of all subsidiaries).

The national confederal committee of the CGT, which met yesterday, is therefore expected to be more than reticent about the government's policies. The CGT will demand that the government carry out its promises more quickly (while demonstrating at the same time, as Georges Seguy recently did, that these promises are grossly inadequate to resolve the crisis). This is an ideal position from which to prepare the next congress, which will be held in less than a year: as the trade union which would not let the government sink into pale reformism, and at the same time retained full freedom to criticize if the experiment was inconclusive. It is on this basis that the CGT hopes to recover the credibility it lost by aligning itself too closely with the PCF.

9855

CSO: 3100/839

BRUNDTLAND DISCUSSES BREZHNEV DEMARCHE, ECONOMY

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 7 Jul 81 p 7

[Excerpts from an article by Jan Ove Ekeberg: "Brezhnev's Demarche"]

[Text] "Brezhnev's initiative concerning a zone in the North free of nuclear weapons is interesting, but is a matter we must deal with in consultation with a number of countries. Inflation cannot be controlled by means of lectures and political tactics. Concrete action must be taken through a long-term economic policy," says vacationing Premier Gro Harlem Brundtland to ARBEIDERBLADET.

To ARBEIDERBLADET the Premier describes Soviet party chairman and top leader Leonid Brezhnev's signals to the effect that Soviet areas as well may be drawn into the debate on a zone in the North free of nuclear weapons as interesting.

"It is obvious that we must continue efforts in this matter, but any solo play on our part is out of the question. First we must learn what our NATO allies and not least the Nordic countries think. But I can promise that thoughtful consideration will be given to the matter; as a start, we are positive to the idea."

A special session on disarmament will be held in the UN next year, at which all problems concerning nuclear-free zones will be discussed.

"It is possible that a kind of model of nuclear-free zones will be arrived at there. In addition such a session will provide opportunities for throwing light upon some matters of principle, such as control of the zone, treaties and guarantees."

Here at home price increases are the current political theme, for a vacationing premier, as well.

"It is useless to fight inflation with speeches on the problem at meetings of Conservatives. What can do it is a long term economic policy. This is the kind of policy the government is preparing in its long-term program. It is also done in the revised national budget passed by the Storting last spring. It is a struggle against rising prices--one that is the basis for the more restrictive public budgets," says Brundtland, adding that price control is no effective means of combating inflation over the long range. "I believe it has finally been realized by those who advocate such things that people know the game and that they will lose it in the long run. It is, therefore, to be hoped that in the future they will concentrate more upon concrete matters."

CONSERVATIVES' CHOICE FOR PREMIER IRKS MANY IN MIDDLE PARTIES

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 4 Jul 81 p 7

[Article by Per Brunvand: "Kare Willoch -- A Red Rag to the Middle Parties"]

[Text] It is causing increasing irritation in the Center Party and the Christian People's Party that not only do the Conservatives present Kare Willoch as their candidate for the premiership, but that he also stands out as a self-appointed candidate for the post of premier in a nonsocialist government. For a while, the Conservatives' improved position in Gallup polls took the breath away from the middle parties, and in this "breathing space" the Conservatives put Willoch forward without reservations. The irritation is now becoming apparent. Kare Willoch has always been a red rag to the middle parties, and he still is.

Nor has Willoch ever been a typical cooperation politician. He cooperates best with his own admirers. It is typical that the Conservatives have never dared use Willoch in important negotiations on collaboration with other parties. This task has been handled by Erling Norvik in recent years. Now it seems that Rolf Presthus has taken over the task. Kare Willoch is still being kept back for tactical reasons.

The Borten Government

Kare Willoch was not one of the unifying forces in the Borten government. His cold intellect, combined with a sarcastic, not to say arrogant, behavior, was not what made the greatest impression on the middle parties when the Borten government gathered around the conference table. It made the least impression upon the Center Party, and least of all upon Per Borten, the government chief, himself. In the Center Party, and probably also in parts of the Christian People's Party, there are many who even today assert that the principal architect behind the breakdown of the Borten government was Kare Willoch, with good help from Helge Seip.

In Dispute Among Conservatives

The Conservatives have now gotten together on Kare Willoch. This does not mean that there has always been and still is agreement about him in his own party. When in 1970 he was elected party chairman he had considerable opposition. He was thought to be a little too typical a Conservative politician, even by many Conservatives. They wanted a chairman not to that degree identified as a professional politician. There was also dissatisfaction with his attitude toward collaboration in the Borten

government. Willoch was elected party chairman, however, and he took his authoritarian attitude along into Conservative House. After 4 years the Conservative party found it best to separate the positions as chairman and parliamentary leader. Even though Willoch left the chairmanship to others there has never been any doubt about who is the real leader of the Conservatives. Both Erling Norvik and Jo Benkow have had to submit to operating in Willoch's shadow. As parliamentary leader as well Willoch has settled internal quarrels, whether with the Young Conservatives, the party's feminist group, or environment politicians.

In the Storting group too, Willoch's leadership has been strict. There is hardly ever an opportunity for a Conservative representative to make an important speech in the Storting without his approval. During the spring session it caused considerable attention that the Conservative members of the industry committee were unable to produce a report on the industry report because Willoch was busy. He was preparing for the TV duel with Premier Gro Harlem Brundtland.

Unacceptable

If we go back to the last Storting election, in 1977, there were not many who thought of Kare Willoch as a realistic premier candidate. Among the Conservatives, more hoped for Erling Norvik, but the chief impression was that the Conservatives would have to bow to the demands made by the middle parties, not least the Center Party. Center Party Chairman Gunnar Stalsett made it clear early that his party could not accept any Conservative premier, nor a majority of cabinet members of that party. He further asserted that a nonsocialist government would have to carry on a centrist policy, not a Conservative policy. It says something about this debate that AFTENPOSTEN soon afterward asked Stalsett to "stop the nonsense," and "in the interest of collaboration behave as an adult, decent person."

The quarreling between the Conservatives and the Center Party had lasted for a long time and received new nourishment in the spring of 1977, when it became known that the Conservatives were reluctant to include the Center Party in an eventual government and would rather get along alone, with the Christian People's Party as a coalition partner. A few days prior to the election, the present Center Party chairman, Johan J. Jakobsen, and the then parliamentary leader Erling Steenberg also made it clear once more in a TV program that the Center Party could not accept a Conservative premier. It also became apparent that Kare Willoch was unacceptable as finance minister in a bourgeois government.

Difficult Years

The nonsocialist parties were spared quarreling about a premier in 1977. The election campaign and the election result were such that the coalition platform was torn to pieces. Only few believed in a new attempt 4 years later, in the fall of 1981. During the 4 years that have passed the "cooperation parties" have in periods worked themselves far apart. This has also resulted in open revolt, in which Kare Willoch has not rarely been the central actor. This was most strongly expressed in the spring of 1978 when Willoch lost his temper and characterized the accommodation of the middle parties with the Labor Party on the tax questions as "compromise-makers without principles." In the same tone he asserted that those who favor the concession law were "purebred socialists." This fed the flames of a

quarrel that has raged between the middle parties and the Conservatives for several years. In the fall of 1978 the Center Party construed it as real party-directed harassment of the Center Party in the Conservative press. The Center Party's main organ NATIONEN responded by printing a daily column containing "The Greeting of the Day from the Conservatives," and gave as its opinion that the middle parties must now gather their strategies and politics in opposition to the Conservatives. The Conservative political leadership was accused of power arrogance.

During the 4-year period now coming to an end there has been internal strife, bitter at times, in the nonsocialist camp concerning the abortion question, tax policy and general economic policy. All the time, Willoch has been in the front line against the middle parties. This has neither charmed nor impressed them.

New Style

Conservative chairman Jo Benkow recently wrote a portrait of Willoch for MORGENBLADET. He does not gloss over Willoch's arrogance, his authoritativeness, his penchant for surrounding himself with fear, mixed with respect, rather than with human contacts, his way of debating, often exceeding the bounds of quarrelsomeness, and his propensity to petty quarrels. It should be added, however, that Benkow's portrait is well intended, conciliatory and explanatory in form. Nevertheless, it provides some essential keys to understanding why so many members of the Christian People's Party and the Center Party have difficulty in seeing Kare Willoch as a unifying leader. His ability to ignite bourgeois enthusiasm beyond the Conservatives is estimated at zero.

In Jo Benkow's opinion much of what is said of Willoch now might have been true at one time, but that it no longer holds true. "We have seen a more open, less reserved Willoch develop in recent years," writes Benkow. And Benkow is right. Kare Willoch is experimenting with a new, more popular style. (Some even assert they have heard him say "Na," not "Nu!")? The change has taken place gradually, but gained speed after Gro Harlem Brundtland became premier. The Conservative leadership suddenly had a problem with its own style. Willoch's style suddenly did not look good when compared to that of his chief opponent. He was in danger of seeming uncouth, while at the same time he and his message appeared oldfashioned in relation to the new one that had entered Norwegian politics. This must have worried both Willoch and the Conservative strategists. Typically, when the Storting debated the government declaration last winter it was decided that, contrary to custom, Willoch would not respond to the Premier's speech. This was decided only the day before the Premier went to the podium, the reason being that it was feared that Willoch would not give a good enough impression. It was anticipated that the exchange between Willoch and the Premier would be broadcast over television. The Conservatives have found a new personal style and Willoch has adjusted to it. The first time it became apparent was in his debate in the spring with the Premier. At that time the viewers saw a new Willoch, smiling, disarming and gentle. Much of the sarcasm was weeded out, though some cactuses struck out.

Nevertheless, though Willoch's outgoing style is different, his basic attitudes are unchanged. He is still a red rag to the middle parties. More than as an inspirer and common leader, they see him as a personal obstacle to wholehearted bourgeois cooperation. However, if the voters desire a nonsocialist government they will have to swallow him.

FRICTION IN FRS COALITION DESCRIBED

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 31 Jul 81 p 3

[Article by Antonio Duarte: "PS Was Planning to Propose 'Disguises' to UEDS and ASDI"]

[Text] A reliable source informed O JORNAL that, at the meeting of the FRS [Socialist Republican Front] coordinating entity, Mario Soares, Almeida Santos and Jaime Gama intended to notify the delegations from ASDI [Independent Social Democratic Association] and UEDS [Leftist Union for Socialist Democracy] that PS [Socialist Party] decided to end the gaging of the strength of those parties insofar as their local status and representation is concerned, with a view toward possible "arrangement" of lists for the forthcoming local government elections.

Shortly before having been surprised by the content of the joint ASDI-UEDS communique calling for the possibility of an "alternative" in the event that FRS did not run in the Loures interim elections, the members of the PS delegation in the Socialist Republican Front coordinating body were planning to distribute "disguises" to their coalition partners, proposing their participation in lists of the "mother-party" in the municipalities and parishes wherein they enjoyed a certain amount of representation.

This proposal is substantially different from the one which ASDI and UEDS offered in the communique that caused the current conflict within FRS. In fact, the "small parties" in the Front, without mentioning a revision of the FRS agreement (which, as everyone knows, has just gone into effect in Parliament), advocate specifically and in a practical manner, that it be the coalition of Socialists and Social Democrats that runs in the Loures elections, and not the PS alone.

It Was Eduardo Pereira Who Triggered the Crisis

Moreover, ASDI and UEDS "threaten" to compete in an "expanded electoral coalition" in the event that the Socialist Party persists in participating in the Loures elections by itself; elections the date of which has been set for 11 October, as we learned from the Loures Chamber.

The harshness with which ASDI and UEDS addressed PS in this communique (for the first time, these parties unequivocally criticized their PS partner in FRS) was based primarily on the recent peremptory statements made by Eduardo Pereira (who

is in charge of the local government sector on the PS Political Commission's Standing Committee) to the weekly publication TEMPO, upholding his party's running with its own lists in 1982, and emphasizing that, "The members of UEDS and/or ASDI do not have an experience of their own that would qualify them in particular to be included on PS lists."

Representing the "radical" line which never approved of the "transformation" of the Socialist Party into FRS, Eduardo Pereira nevertheless made these statements somewhat in default of the PS leadership; because, as we have noted, there existed, and there still exists, despite the impasse that has been created, to be submitted to ASDI and UEDS, the proposal of PS lists with members of the two other partners of the Socialist Republican Front.

Doubts and Certainties in the Loures Chamber

In connection with the Loures Chamber, thus far and until another meeting of the FRS coordinating entity is held, there has persisted doubt whether the Socialists will accept a coalition with its partners in Parliament, or will include some members of ASDI and UEDS on the list to be presented on 11 October. We are guaranteed one certainty by sources close to Soares (assertions which oddly coincide with those of members of the PS minority): Loures cannot be a "trial balloon" or "typical case" that affords "an opportunity for speculation and extrapolation" relating to future situations on the local or national level. In this respect, the "old" question of the alliance with PSD [Social Democratic Party] for the municipality of Loures must be finally terminated by PS (although CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] is flatly opposed to this).

However, the same sources add that alliances between PS and PSD in municipalities and parishes may be made in 1982, although in individual instances within the general context of the local government elections.

Soares' 'Authority' Damaged

Nevertheless, the reaction of Mario Soares, Almeida Santos and Jaime Gama to the joint ASDI-UEDS communique may have been caused by merely formal reasons, particularly since the authority and supremacy of the Socialist Party in the Front have been "damaged" when confronted with "a connected system of links between the two parties unaccepted by PS."

When contacted by O JORNAL yesterday, Antonio Vitorino, of UEDS, admitted "between the lines" a hastiness by his party in signing the communique at this point, telling us: "For our part, we are always willing to accept well-intentioned criticism, and to reexamine concrete situations, which does not preclude our total reaffirmation of the contents of the joint communique, as well as our dedication to the development of the FRS plan, the potential of which is too important to the nation's future to be jeopardized by incidents concentrated essentially on matters of a merely formal nature."

As for Cunha Leal, of ASDI, when asked by O JORNAL whether the joint communique was hasty, he replied: "What matters are the intentions."

A concrete incident which lends consistency to the "theory" that the PS' reaction to the stopping of the meeting of the FRS coordinating entity was "fostered" by formal reasons is the fact that Mario Soares, Almeida Santos and Jaime Gama were surprised and annoyed that Magalhaes Mota signed the communique (together with Lopes Cardoso) and did not appear (because he was away, abroad) at the FRS assembly that ended up being halted.

Cunha Leal (ASDI): 'Tempest In a Teapot'

At the meeting of the PS Standing Committee which lasted until dawn yesterday (Thursday), the Socialist leaders acted cautiously, and attempted, despite everything, to prevent the FRS accord from experiencing "harm" or "serious damage," at least at the present time.

While it was expected that the meeting would be "heated," the Standing Committee confined itself to discussing again formal issues relating to FRS, debating aspects of the constitutional revision, and being informed of the PS' good electoral prospects, in addition to having criticized Alvaro Cunhal for "fantastic statements" about relations between Angola and Portugal, and the government for not having done anything to put an end to the disorders.

In this way, the Socialists are attempting to undramatize the "fire" in FRS, with the coals postponed until the next meeting of the Socialist Republican Front's coordinating body.

Deputy Cunhal Leal told us yesterday: "It appears that the issue was reduced to its proper proportions; in other words, it was all a tempest in a teapot."

However, this ASDI leader, like Antonio Vitorino, stressed that the proposal for FRS participation in the Loures elections would be maintained: "Although the local government elections are excluded from the FRS accord, we prefer to run on the level of the Front, and we ourselves will run an electoral coalition if that does not occur."

Antonio Vitorino (UEDS): 'Undramatize the Incident'

The direct manner in which these statements have been made may mean that the mutual struggle will still be difficult; especially because, although PS has decided to include "independents" and members of ASDI and UEDS in its local lists, there will be local governments wherein Mario Soares will not yield in the slightest degree to the demands of the partners, owing to their lack of representative status.

Cunha Leal does not agree with the classification "ghost local officials" which a leader of the PS majority used in describing the situation as a result of this type of concession, and expressed great optimism stating: "If we had that opinion, we would be ceasing to believe in ourselves. That would represent a disbelief in FRS itself."

In a more thoughtful fashion, Antonio Vitorino analyses the controversy in the Socialist Republican Front as follows: "In my opinion, the situation created in FRS by the PS' attitude toward the joint communique of the ASDI and UEDS parliamentary leaderships should be a cause for reflection on the relations among the FRS parties, and a factor for determining the future of the Front itself. The

ASDI-UEDS communique is nothing new, inasmuch as, at least twice during the past few months, joint positions of the ASDI and UEDS parliamentary leaders have been publicized, without any criticism voiced by another partner in the Front. Secondly, the accord establishing the FRS does not prevent any of the member parties from free engagement in bilateral relations, either within the Front or with forces outside of it. Moreover, whether formally or informally, this has been a practice of these parties and, of course, of PS itself. Therefore, there is on the part of UEDS an unequivocal political desire to undramatize the incident; because we believe that the wager we made on a political accord between Socialists and Social Democrats, confronted with the accelerated deterioration of the AD [Democratic Alliance] plan, is not merely a circumstantial wager, but rather one which expresses a strategic option of affirmation for a democratic, progressive political plan for Portugal."

2909

CSO: 3101/97

COALITION POLITICIANS DISCUSS RESTRUCTURING OF GOVERNMENT

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 31 Jul 81 pp 2, 3

[Article by Carneiro Jacinto: "Freitas do Amaral Conferred With Eurico de Melo and Cavaco e Silva"]

[Text] The restructuring of the government may be imminent, at the end of next week, after the Pinto Balsemao options have been analyzed by all the parties concerned. Of the contacts made this week, the lengthy meetings which, as O JORNAL learned, took place between Freitas do Amaral and Eurico de Melo and Cavaco Silva, in the latter's office, stand out owing to their significance.

The PSD's [Social Democratic Party] political commission may meet next Monday, 3 August, to hear an address by the prime minister, Pinto Balsemao, concerning the restructuring of the government. Social Democratic sources told O JORNAL that the restructuring would not be made public before a summit of AD [Democratic Alliance] and a special national council meeting of PSD, at which the issue would be discussed. Thus, there is no confirmation of the evening press reports claiming that the restructuring would be announced Monday. It is still admitted that Pinto Balsemao has been faced with difficulties in taking steps toward the restructuring, on which Antonio Capucho and Meneres Pimentel, among others, are also working.

The major questions posed at present are those relating to ascertaining the scope of the changes, and the maneuvering capacity that Pinto Balsemao will have for summoning to the executive branch the "great" personages of AD, such as Freitas do Amaral and Eurico de Melo, among others.

These two questions are closely linked and, in AD circles, it is thought that the success of one will depend on the success of the other. Pinto Balsemao may have been sensitive to the argument put forth by leaders of both PSD and CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] claiming that the government's policy and composition must change drastically.

In this regard, a hypothesis very pleasing to Carlos Macedo (which we cited in our last issue): the formation of a strong political cabinet accompanying the prime minister, appears to be gaining ground. In that eventuality, Freitas do Amaral and Goncalo Ribeiro Teles would be vice-prime ministers; and also the position of minister of state responsible for the association with Parliament would be given to a member of PSD. There would, in addition, be changes on the level of staff advisers to the prime minister, from the standpoint of lending the cabinet "greater

weight, operativeness and capacity for intervention," something which, in the view of many PSD officials, has not existed.

Owing to the influence of the trade union sectors in particular, PSD would like to be assured of the Ministries of Labor, Social Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Finance and Education.

Among the current members of the government, mention is made of the departure of Cardoso e Cunha, Goncalves Pereira (who agreed with the prime minister to remain only a year in the government) and Alvaro Barreto.

However, there are sectors which do not think that there are many people interested in entering the government now, "because that would be another expedient solution, and the process of internal strife will continue until the Congress." These sectors maintain that neither Eurico de Melo nor Cavaco Silva would be willing to enter the government. Freitas do Amaral, in turn, continues to tell Pinto Balsemao (as occurred at the meeting between the two) that he is willing to lend his backing to the government, but without becoming committed to the staff.

Freitas do Amaral: Consecutive Meetings With Eurico de Melo and Cavaco Silva

Meanwhile, Eurico de Melo was the personage of the week in the political context of the crisis besetting AD and the government. Invited to come to Lisbon by the prime minister, the former head of the Ministry of Internal Administration engaged in intensive political activity all week long, with a proliferation of contacts of all types.

Whereas, on Wednesday, he had lunch with Balsemao, by whom he was received that same evening during a break in the PSD political commission meeting, on that same day and on Thursday, 30 July, he held very lengthy meetings with Freitas do Amaral and Cavaco Silva in the latter's office at the National Planning Council. Eurico de Melo also met with Helena Roseta, to whom he explained the conversation that he had held with Pinto Balsemao. Helena Roseta was also present at the first meeting between Eurico de Melo, Freitas do Amaral and Cavaco Silva.

That major northern industrialist appears to be undecided in his choice between accepting a possible proposal from Balsemao to join the government and serving as an alternative to the leadership of the current prime minister, including giving the latter his backing for the first time. Eurico de Melo might play the role of a reconciler of movements and, in that connection, he might attempt to motivate Freitas do Amaral to make a strong effort backing the government, and even for joining the new group of ministers.

To summarize, a PSD source told O JORNAL that Eurico de Melo decided to give Balsemao another chance, postponing a possible confrontation until another occasion. At the meeting with Balsemao, Eurico de Melo, despite his discretion, did not fail to point out to the prime minister "some courses of action that he should pursue in order to resolve the situation," and "attempted, on the other hand, to dispel the notion that he was behind the recent endeavors of Carlos Macedo."

Balsemao Cautious About Carlos Macedo

Carlos Macedo's resignation occupied most of the debate among the PSD political commission. The former minister of social affairs stressed again the reasons that prompted him to leave: the non-resignation of the government after the "failure" of the law of the sectors in favor of the CR [Council of the Revolution], and the prime minister's speech in Ourique, in addition to stating that "there are sectors which think that the government is not operating and has a lack of leadership." Carlos Macedo never expressed personal views, always speaking in the plural, and in this way opposing the prime minister rather harshly.

Pinto Balsemao, for his part, confined himself to explaining that, "in view of the fact that Dr Carlos Macedo considered his decision to be irrevocable, I opted to accept the resignation." According to our informants, Balsemao was very cautious and circumspect throughout the entire meeting, avoiding the exacerbation of any personal dispute with Carlos Macedo. The prime minister also discussed the meeting that he had with Freitas do Amaral, at which the latter told him the same thing as always: "that he is endeavoring to support the government and to reinforce AD." However, Freitas do Amaral did not come up with any new position, preferring to remain awaiting the next initiatives of the head of the government.

In his third "attempt," Carlos Macedo ended up accomplishing his departure from the government. The last two followed each other during a period of 1 week, and apparently originated from the same reasons. The analysis made by Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa in EXPRESSO, in which the editor of that weekly publication harshly attacked the minister of social affairs, prompted Carlos Macedo to make a peremptory decision: In the absence of the prime minister in Algarve, he sent a letter to the chairman of the Council of Ministers, resigning. Balsemao, upon returning from an ocean trip, received the news by telephone, and acted immediately to accept the request for resignation.

The Role of Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa

A member of Carlos Macedo's staff told us that same day that Pinto Balsemao had asked Rebelo de Sousa, at a meeting in the residence of Goncalves Pereira, "to be more moderate in his analysis," but the editor of EXPRESSO opted to tell everything that he knew.

Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa told us: "My analysis was based on facts, facts which are not denied by Carlos Macedo." And he added: "It is not the first time that EXPRESSO has mentioned the ambitions of Carlos Macedo; and, in this instance, I would say that each one contains its truth."

This analysis gave rise to an extremely violent, in depth article by Sousa Tavares in which Rebelo de Sousa and Balsemao were not spared and in which, oddly enough, the resignation of Carlos Macedo was announced first-hand.

Since this political-journalistic storm, mention is now being made again of the possibility of Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa's even being invited to join the government, an idea which he would greatly cherish, and which the prime minister left in the air at the time of the first mini-restructuring.

PSD: There Are Already 2,500 Signatures For the Special Congress

The situation continues to be very tense in PSD, and the leading officials even think that, if Pinto Balsemao does not solve the problem of the party and the government at the same time, everything will remain the same.

It appears certain that there are now 2,500 signatures ready to be delivered at any time in PSD, in the event that it becomes necessary, in the view of Balsemao's challengers, to convoke a special congress, which never convened before November.

The public proponents of this proposition are Helena Roseta ("I am not doing a thing" to collect signatures), the districts of Lisbon and Porto, and Mario Raposo; while other opponents are maintaining a wait-and-see attitude, awaiting a better opportunity. At the present time, Balsemao has the backing of the trade unionists, the socioprofessionals and the youth organization, in addition to that of nearly all the ministers and some members of the political commission. The PSD in the Azores and Madeira has also expressed opposition to the calling of a special congress.

In view of the fact that the PSD's regular congress is held in February, it seems rather unlikely that a special congress will be convoked, unless the restructuring of the government proves to be "quite unsuccessful."

However, it remains to be explained how the vacant positions on the PSD's political commission will be filled, a matter that was not discussed at the last meeting.

6 Months of Freitas Against Balsemao

Within the CDS, Freitas do Amaral has continued to launch forceful attacks in private against Pinto Balsemao, giving a reminder that, after 6 months of governing, the misgivings concerning the prime minister have been confirmed. Freitas do Amaral is even said to have favored the resignation of the CDS ministers from the government, something which was not accepted by them, and prompted the head of CDS to consider the "governmentalist" ministers. Basilio Horta, for his part, still defends the government, and claims that the crisis has been caused outside of the executive branch. Morais Letao, confining himself to the economic situation, remarked in an enigmatic tone, as someone told us, that it would be better not to discuss the matter too much, because it would inevitably result in succumbing to criticism of the policy of the Sa Carneiro government.

Of the three hypotheses currently being discussed with AD (leadership of Balsemao, the three leaders in the government, or an alternative wherein PSD would be responsible), both Freitas do Amaral and the top-ranking leaders of CDS, with the exception of Basilio Horta, preferred the latter.

1979
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PSUC GENERAL SECRETARY INTERVIEWED ON PARTY DIVISIONS

Madrid LA CALLE in Spanish 14-20 Jul 81 pp 16-19

[Interviews with PSUC Secretary General Francesc Frutos and former PSUC President Pere Ardiaca by Julia Luzan, time and place not given]

[Text] The Fourth National Conference of the Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia (PSUC), held this past weekend, adopted by an almost two-thirds majority (133 votes in favor, 66 against and 6 abstentions) to reinstate the Eurocommunist nature of the party's policies. The PSUC had abandoned the term in the resolutions of its Fifth Congress, held in January. The Conference was preceded by intense debates and reports to the Central Committee from its Executive Committee, in an effort to overcome a crisis that intensified day after day among the different sectors of the Catalanian Communists. Tensions between the "Pro-Soviets" and the "Euros" had culminated with the Central Committee's ouster of its president, Pere Ardiaca, last 4 July, for having publicly opposed the "Eurocommunist" resolution that was passed this weekend at the National Conference.

Many local Catalanian groups do not want the PSUC to become Eurocommunist again, and have made former President Pere Ardiaca their standardbearer. "Our legitimate president," they have called him on different occasions. Saturday, in Barcelona, they shouted it once again. This time they came to blows with "Euro" advocates. Sole Tura became a hero. Secretary General Francesc Frutos took a hard line; he wants the PSUC to return to normalcy, and he will rigorously enforce the Bylaws. Thus, there will be expulsions.

The crisis, expressed in the interview with PSUC Secretary General Francesc Frutos which we are printing here, was prevalent at the Conference. The "Leninists" and "Euros" voted in a bloc to break the impasse. But Pere Ardiaca is "willing to fight," as he indicated in our interview. Unity may still be a long way off.

Question: What happened in the PSUC to make the Central Committee vote recently to remove its president, Pere Ardiaca?

Answer: In the Executive Committee, before convening the National Conference on 16 and 17 May, there was a wide-ranging and profound discussion of the party's internal problems and the relationship they bear to our inability to implement a policy concerning society as a whole. It is well known that after the PSUC Fifth

Congress, the conflicts and divisions that racked the party left it unable to carry out its social policy. As a consequence of that, and also taking into consideration the Spanish political situation since 23 February, and the problems that already existed but have now been brought to the fore in the most blatant manner (unemployment, the crisis, terrorism), we felt the need to put an end to the exceptional period in the party and find a multi-faceted, balanced solution. No party sector would be excluded from the solution, which would reflect the overall policy approved at the Fifth Congress, to move forward toward what the party really should be: a political action to battle for the interests we represent, to improve our working conditions and to advance toward socialism. As a result, we made a resolution that was thoroughly discussed and analyzed in the Executive Committee, to the effect that the word Eurocommunism, the concept Eurocommunism, would not represent a divisive line between party sectors. Rather, it would represent solely and exclusively the public normality that has characterized our policy of socialism in liberty and the revolution of the majority.

Question] But you can't deny that to bring out the word Eurocommunism at the end of the PSUC Fifth Congress was a shock to many sectors of Spanish society.

Answer] Obviously, it had a public impact. We cannot ignore the international repercussions of the fact that bringing out the word Eurocommunism was associated with the liquidation of an entire traditional policy that had given the PSUC a strong social, political and cultural base in Catalonian society. That is why we in the Executive Committee knew that enforcing the policy of the Fifth Congress meant relaxing tensions and passing a resolution thoroughly discussed and debated, and unanimously approved by the Executive Committee.

Question] This resolution brought back the term Eurocommunism. It states that "it is possible and appropriate to reaffirm the Eurocommunist nature of our policies." But you say that in the Executive Committee the proposal was approved unanimously, even though that unanimity was broken a few weeks ago when the resolution was debated in the Central Committee. What happened?

Answer] In the Central Committee, the unanimous affirmative vote was broken by two comrades on the Executive Committee who voted against it. One was Comrade Pere Ardiaca. Fine, that vote reflects the political position of a comrade, although in this case it was the party president, who had also committed himself to voting for the resolution. But nothing happened. Afterwards, different organizations that talked of objectively making Pere Ardiaca something of a symbol of the Fifth Congress, immediately sent resolutions to the Central Committee.

Question] In your report to the Central Committee on 4 July, you even stated that President Pere Ardiaca was being used as a standardbearer for the "legality of the party."

Answer] Yes. The standard of the policy of the Fifth Congress agreements, when in the resolution we stated very clearly that those agreements were in no way being repudiated; we were simply rectifying some contradictions that appeared in a resolution in order to be able to enforce the entire policy defined at the Fifth Congress. The ten points sum up the need for Comrade Pere Ardiaca to lead the whole party, all its members and organizations, in one direction: first,

after having voted against the resolution, as everyone knows, he should accept the agreements of the Central Committee, agreements which linked all the members of that party executive body, between congresses; and second, no party organization or member should use him as a standardbearer to defend the legitimate positions that may exist within the party. That was the proposal.

[Question] In other words, the agreements should be subject to a majority vote.

[Answer] It was not even stated in terms of a majority vote; simply as a function of the party's internal regulations. Nor was it suggested that he recant; but once he had voted against the measure, as president of the party and a member of the Central Committee, he should defend that resolution, without retracting his opinion, his political position.

[Question] In many political circles it is said that this whole uproar over the ouster is exactly what the doomsayers said would happen after the conclusions of the PSUC Fifth Congress. They said that after January, the PSUC could have some tremendous conflicts. It appears to be the case, doesn't it?

[Answer] I don't know what the doomsayers said. As a party member, I was operating in the context of our history, our way of operating and our democracy. We try to solve our political problems by means of a democratic debate which allows us to get a clear view of everyone's positions, to find points of agreement and seek a policy that is valid for the entire party.

[Question] Although one can't really speak of organic factions, you must admit that there are factions within the PSUC.

[Answer] I don't believe there are factions. There are members who firmly express different political positions. That has always been true, not just now. What is happening is that this is a time of political convulsion arising from the general situation in the country, even from international pressure. This objective situation pressures people to contract and polarize their positions. Another development, which the Central Committee has already studied, is that there has been a major rift between the party leadership and its organizations. This split has historical roots, dating back to the transition, and stemming from the myriad tasks the party has had to tackle. Perhaps for that reason the decisions of the Central Committee have not been communicated well to the organizations so that they can be the subject of a democratic debate and not distorted into simplistic positions.

[Question] Speaking of simplistic positions, isn't it true that the PSUC is divided at present between "Euro" and "Pro-Soviet" sectors, or between the "hard" and "soft" sectors?

[Answer] I will never accept that formulation. If I did accept it and spoke of it in an interview, I would be adding fuel to the fires of those who say that there are two antagonistic positions in the party, two irreconcilable policies. That is not so. There are different political positions resulting from all kinds of objective conditions, as mentioned earlier, and also from subjective conditions such as the manner of debating and of formulating policy within the organization.

And if I don't want to talk about these two viewpoints that are alleged to exist within the party, it is because that would be another simplistic approach. It would be just as simplistic to say that all the viewpoints that exist are represented, and that those represented are all there is. That is almost never true. That is why the Executive Committee wants to place the party on a clear, unequivocal path toward socialism. It wants to avoid destroying the essence of the party by moving toward social democracy or by falling into closed, dogmatic positions that do not allow for progress. I am not concerned about narrow bands within the party that lead to critical, even hypercritical positions with respect to one side or the other. What I am concerned about is the party as a whole; I want it to be able to move forward with a policy, a human policy that is its own.

[Question] Will a special congress have to be called to put an end to the crisis?

[Answer] We on the Executive Committee proposed to the Central Committee, and that body agreed, that the conference this past weekend should mark the end of the exceptional period in our party. From now on we will enter a new phase of debate on the content of the party policy, above all, without paralyzing the party's external activities.

[Question] Does the ouster of President Pere Ardiaca end the last crisis of the PSUC, or does it begin a new one?

[Answer] Pere Ardiaca's dismissal has been one more element--albeit a very important one, since he was president of the party--of this crisis. We would be wrong if we thought that his ouster did not create new problems, but I am convinced that the results of this conference will be viewed responsibly, within the proper context. And later, when it comes time to implement policy, the party will do its utmost to overcome the problems.

[Question] Will there not be another president for the next 4 years?

[Answer] That depends on the party's political situation. But for the moment, it does not look likely.

Ardiaca Accuses

[Question] At a meeting of the Central Committee on 4 July, at which you were deposed as president of the PSUC, Secretary General Francesc Frutos' report asserted that he did not want--that it would not be good for the party, in short--for you to become a standardbearer. Do you feel you are a standardbearer for some sector of the PSUC?

[Answer] Absolutely not. I am not, nor could I be. What is happening is that there are some very stubborn positions that have been taken since the Fifth Congress. In my opinion, they have been erroneously encouraged since the resolution was passed in May to use the word Eurocommunist to describe the party's policy. These positions have been even further encouraged by the decision to depose me as president of the PSUC. This is a political question; it has nothing to do with personal matters. Politically, I think the Central Committee voted to depose me with a majority vote, but based on a premise that is contrary to the agreements of the Fifth Congress.

[Question] What point do you feel is contrary to the agreements of the PSUC Fifth Congress?

[Answer] The reinstatement of the word Eurocommunist, which has a great many connotations.

[Question] Nevertheless, it is a question of nuances of the May resolution. . .

[Answer] Yes, it is a question of nuances and of content. Later, after the Congress, these issues have been very clearly defined, especially because in addition to all the implications they had at the Congress, they have a new projection now. In some cases that projection goes beyond what was set forth at the Congress. For example, one executive body was constituted, but it is well known that in addition to that at least two other executive groups were created: that of Gutierrez Diaz and Gregorio Lopez Raimundo, who claimed to have a belligerent and confrontational attitude toward the official leaders named by the Fifth Congress; and another executive group or nucleus, made up of Jordi Borja, Sole Tura, Jordi Conill and others, who have also gathered openly and publicly to decide who will lead in Barcelona. The latter nucleus is the most "Euro," taking for the most part the approach outlined in the article by Comrade Borja which appeared in LA CALLE. That article broke with the Communists in taking a position which Borja himself bases on the idea that the party should take power soon, or else the voters will abandon it. For this reason, Jordi Borja advocates working directly to join the Socialist parties. This is one opinion. I have nothing against Comrade Borja's right to have his opinion, but I do not agree with it. I am fighting, with all the honest means at my disposal, against that policy. To complete the picture, there is another nucleus that has emerged in response to criticism of the failure to comply with the agreements of the Fifth Congress.

[Question] And that is where you come in and raise the standard. . .

[Answer] No. I am not at the head of any nucleus.

[Question] You cannot deny that the latter nucleus has a lot of points in common with you. . .

[Answer] This nucleus is composed, obviously, of all those who are trying to defend the agreements of the Fifth Congress. For that reason, more than one nucleus makes up the base of the party.

[Question] And would you define that nucleus as Pro-Soviet, critical, hard-line. . . ? I know you will tell me that is a very simplistic approach, but. . .

[Answer] Yes, it is simplistic, and the comrades who have attached those labels are very intelligent.

[Question] Comrades: wasn't it the press, the mass media, that labeled the party Pro-Soviet, Afghan, Leninist, etc.?

[Answer] No, no. It was our comrades who did so. And among them is Jordi Borja. These comrades devised these labels for a political end, to discredit people.

Pro-Soviet? Can they be called anti-Soviet? The Eurocommunist sector, which has sometimes been called anti-Soviet within the party, reacts by saying that they are the pro-Soviets. I don't know which came first, the chicken or the egg. As for the term "Afghan," it doesn't come from the press either. The press has picked it up, repeated it and made it common, but before that it was the "Euros" who coined the term "Afghan." That was in bad taste, as it is an insult to the Afghan people. They say they don't agree with the invasion of Afghanistan; well, the Fifth Congress said so too. Thus, when we speak of solidarity with all the Communist Parties of the world, we do not question the independence of the PSUC or that of all the Communist Parties of the world. Nor do we call into doubt the right to criticize all the Communist Parties in the world, including the Communist Party of Spain (PCE).

Question: Are you critical of the current leaders of the PCE?

Answer: Yes. I criticize them because I think they are going against the agreements of the Fifth Congress. The PSUC Congress brought up the issue of being, I would say, more than leftists, so as not to be confused with the Democratic Center Union (UCD). I do not mean by that that no pacts can be made. The Moncloa Pacts were not criticized initially by the Fifth Congress. What it did criticize was the way those pacts were strictly adhered to when it was obvious that the UCD was complying only with the parts that favored it. And now Santiago Carrillo complains that he has lost members; of course he has. I, who have contact with the rank and file, in my group in Lerida, know that is true.

Question: Concerning this conflict-ridden Fifth Congress, do you think perhaps there is an effort afoot to renege on the agreements that were made in January?

Answer: The agreements should have been carried out. But I think there has been pressure by the nuclei I mentioned earlier and by the PCE itself. This pressure has caused the Executive Committee to reconsider its initial decision to state that it was not mandatory to call the party Eurocommunist, but that they were not saying no one could use the term "Euro." But the party as such lost that word, obliging all members to consider themselves Eurocommunists.

Question: Everyone agreed that the Fifth Congress was a model of democracy. There was light; there were stenographic reporters. Nothing was hidden.

Answer: That is why I say those agreements were democratic, and that is why they must be accepted. My "Euro" comrades must forgive me for asking, How are they going to convince people that they are with the revolution of the majority, if they don't accept what the majority of the party says? They should have accepted the agreements of the Fifth Congress, accepted the practice of democratic centralism, pronounced their entire policy, all their issues, and fought the way I think I am fighting now.

Question: That is, you are not willing to silence your disagreement.

Answer: That is why they trusted me. I am not willing to be silent, and I prefer to maintain my ability to act freely rather than be president and thus be subject to the discipline of the Executive Committee, the vast majority of whose members think differently than I do.

I refused to step down; I preferred to have them depose me, because if I resigned that meant I was renouncing a policy which I consider just. I will continue to hold my opinions within the party, if everyone does the same.

Now, if others express their opinions outside, I will have to do the same.

[Question] Will this open crisis in the PSUC be overcome after the National Conference?

[Answer] I think all this will be reabsorbed. There may be a period of excitement over events that are happening in different groups, in Hospitalet, Mataro, San Cugat, in different places. But the Executive Committee will realize that it must go through the party. It will regroup with the agreements that are reached at the next congress.

8926

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PAPER COMMENTS ON TASKS AHEAD FOR NEW POLITICAL SEASON

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 19 Jul 81 p 2

[Editorial]

[Text] The centrist parties have been in power for 2 months now. So far the most remarkable thing that has happened during this time is that the prime minister and his cabinet have moved from the Government Office Building to Rosenbad on the other side of Strommen.

The big test will come when the cabinet ministers and their closest political allies reassemble in August. The government announced, somewhat unwisely, in its policy statement, that it would cut as much as 12 billion kronor from next year's budget. That is more than the 2 budget cuts combined that have already been approved (about 10 billion). If the government is actually to succeed in keeping its promise, there will be a real battle for state subsidies and activities.

Saving money is a necessity, but will the first Swedish centrist government go down in history as the government that economized itself into a crushing defeat at the polls? Or will it show that the two middle parties in Swedish politics stand for something other than belt tightening?

Centrist politics are merely tactics, the right is wont to say.

The centrist parties do not dare to take the necessary steps out of fear of the Social Democrats. The Center Party and the Liberal Party are only "in-between parties" as the Conservative Party secretary, Lars Tobisson, likes to say.

The Social Democrats have another favorite thought. The nonsocialists have no politics of their own, they say--from Ernst Wigforss to Olof Palme--they are united only by their opposition to Social Democracy. This analysis does not exactly reflect the current situation now that nonsocialist unity has been broken in such a central question as the tax system, but there are still a few Social Democrats who cling to the old idea. The demise of the three-party coalition has at present split the nonsocialists, to be sure, but it may mean that the three parties, as they did in the 1979 election, can gather votes from various directions and defeat the Social Democrats in this way.

But what do the Center and Liberal Parties themselves say? Two months of silence do not indicate any great ability to act. Perhaps the centrist coalition actually has decided simply to continue governing, thrash its way through the budget cuts, perhaps put together a tax reform with the Social Democrats, and tackle all the upcoming crises and problems.

Of course, this will keep them busy, but it will hardly give the voters the impression that something new has emerged from the broken three-party coalition government and it will hardly present the image of a dynamic, strong-willed government that stands for an alternative in Swedish politics.

There is no reason for the leadership of the Center and Liberal Parties to relax because they are in power. Opinion poll figures are catastrophic for both parties and the situation will not improve if the main topic this fall is cutbacks on all fronts.

If the centrist parties are to appear as a real and interesting alternative to the voters, the government must be characterized by unity and drive. Old disagreements between the Center Party and the Liberal Party are fewer now than in recent years. Those that remain must be put aside until after the election.

The cabinet ministers must agree to cut the budget in a coherent manner and then present this message together not only at closed meetings, but also in public.

In making budget cuts it should be natural for the centrist parties to work consistently within two main principles: Budget cuts must not be made at the expense of those who have the least and they must not hurt the chances of the next generation to live a tolerable life.

This requires insight into which groups are in the worst situation. The Central Bureau of Statistics' report of last year on inequality in Sweden is a good starting point. It also requires courage to say no to drastic cuts in education, where the younger generation's chances to get along in adulthood are decided. Cuts in research must also be rejected, since research lays the groundwork for our country's development after the year 2000.

For the sake of coming generations, it is necessary for those who work--as well as many pensioners--to relax their demands. The overconsumption of the 1970's cannot continue. It should be possible to create understanding for budget cuts in the light of future prospects.

This fall the tax agreement with the Social Democrats will result in a concrete proposal. It is important for the government and the largest opposition party to have the strength and courage to complete this work.

In addition to cuts and tax reform, however, the centrist government must also show the voters that it has the political desire to change society farther down the road. Thus, vision is needed. Struggle against power concentration in industry, organizations, and administration and measures for a better environment, alternative energy sources, more sense of social community and international solidarity--these are issues that could unite the centrist parties.

A government must not simply administer. It must also govern. The centrist government, however, must accomplish one other task. It must also create opinion--if it does not want the center alternative to fade away.

CHARGES LEVELED, DEATH SENTENCES ASKED IN DISK CASE

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 26 Jun 81 pp 1,7

[Text] A case against DISK [Confederation of Revolutionary Worker Unions] Chairman General Abdullah Basturk and 51 fellow members has been opened by the Istanbul Martial Law Commandant military prosecutor, and the death sentence has been demanded.

At a press conference held yesterday, Istanbul Martial Law Commandant military prosecutor Judicial Colonel Suleyman Takkeci said, "When DISK was a legal organization, it was transformed into an illegal organization through economic, political, and ideologic activities that sought to destroy the Turkish state and replace it with a Marxist-Leninist system."

DISK officials being charged under TCK [Turkish Criminal Code] Article 146 and for whom the death penalty is being sought are:

Basturk (chairman general), Riza Guven, Celal Kucuk, Fehmi Isiklar, Kemal Nebioglu, Mukbil Zirtiloglu, Tuncer Kocamanoglu, Mustafa Aktolgali, and Suleyman Celebi (executive council members).

Administrative council members: Selahattin Sayin, Halil Hayta, Kemal Yilmaz, Ali Sahin, Mehmet Mihlaci, Kenan Akman, Niyazi Kuas, Mustafa Karadayi, Ismet Cantekin, I. Hakki Onal, Berguzar Can, Demirhan Tuncay, Nusret Aydin, Ridvan Budak, Ekrem Akkus, Durmus Ali Yalniz, Tahir Guner, Akcin Koc, Yalcin Talaka, and Ozcan Kesgec.

Honor council members: Ergun Faruk Erdem, Talat Oz, Turker Azatli, Ali Taser, Ismail Caliskan, Cemal Aslan, Osman Ozkan, and Saban Aydin.

Supervisory council members: Fikri Tanta, Mehmet Bekirogullari, Ismail Ozbicer, Kemal Akar, and Ali Kocaman.

Regional representatives: Ali Kaya, Yusuf Yurekli, Sefer Guvenc, Saim Akbulut, Recep Koc, Tayyar Olmez, Rafet Demirkoy, Suleyman Turan, Celal Alcinakaya, and Hasan Kahraman.

Ahmet Isvan, former Istanbul municipal chairman who was arrested in conjunction with the DISK case, is not among the suspects for whom the death penalty is being asked. In addition, as a result of an objection raised at the time of their arrest, six suspects from among the DISK administrators for whom the death penalty is being demanded were released. The suspects who are not in custody and for whom the death sentence is being sought are:

Mehmet Mihlaci, Demirhan Tuncer, Kemal Akar, Nusret Aydin, Turker Azakli, and Ali Kocaman.

DISK attorneys have appealed once again to the military prosecutor protesting its decision to continue to hold the 153 DISK administrators whose request for release was rejected by the military court.

At yesterday's press conference, Istanbul Martial Law Commandant military prosecutor Judicial Colonel Takkeci said that the suspects, by trampling the laws during DISK activities, sought to drag the Turkish state to the point of rebellion and revolution and to destroy the Turkish state in an atmosphere of anarchy. With this mentality, it worked to carry out its policies and actions through the masses of workers. Takkeci said:

Prosecutor's Statement

"This investigation conducted by our military prosecutor office since the second half of December 1980 includes DISK and unions affiliated with this confederation together with persons, societies, and other organizations whose goals or activities have been united with the former. Accordingly, there are now over 2,000 suspects. If we bear in mind the scope of the organization throughout Turkey, it is obvious that the number of suspects can increase.

"Keeping in mind the facts that investigating an organization that has existed for many years and the activities in which it engaged would require a lengthy period of time and that the possibility of bringing a portion of the suspects that have been arrested and could be brought to trial before a judge could, in time, be wrested from us, our military prosecutor's office proposed dealing with this case in sections with respect to characteristics of the investigative units, cooperating agencies, and activities, completing one part of the investigation, and initiating a court case. The first section of the complete case concerns DISK, which comes to the forefront in the investigation. We have reached a point in the investigation of DISK alone so that it can be separated from the entire investigation.

Separate Cases

"Following this first section of the DISK case, which has been prepared by our military prosecutor's office with respect to the characteristics of the the investigative units, cooperating agencies, and activities,

investigations of unions whose general headquarters are in Istanbul will be completed and cases opened. Thereafter, the same will be done regarding unions whose headquarters are not located in Istanbul. At this point, let me say that investigations being conducted regarding individuals, groups, societies, and organizations that have demonstrated that their goal is to cooperate with DISK and unions affiliated with DISK will also be completed and legal action will be taken. In fact, many of the suspects who have a voice in the administration of the confederation have fled the country or have not yet been found and, therefore, investigations have not yet been completed. Too, DISK training specialists have not been included in this initial section of the case dealing directly with DISK opened by our military prosecutor's office. At a later stage, court action will be taken against those who fled and the training specialists depending upon conclusions that are reached.

Accounts To Be Examined

"Furthermore, the accounts of both DISK and the unions affiliated with DISK are being examined in accordance with regulations, and investigations are underway regarding goods that are known to have been brought into the country illegally.

"Within the framework of the general outline we have drawn, we have reached the point such that a case dealing with DISK can be opened by separating this part of the investigation from the entire investigation. This case covers a total of 52 suspects, the chief of these being Chairman General Basturk and including 8 additional members of the executive council, 20 members of the administrative council, 8 members of the honor council, 5 members of the supervisory council, and 10 regional representatives.

15-16 June

"DISK, which was established by law and which consists of professionals who should respect regulations, provided evidence of the danger it posed in the 15 and 16 June incidents that it designed as an initial mass action with its desire to drag the nation into an atmosphere of anarchy and rebellion for the purpose of preventing a law bill that was before the Turkish Grand National Assembly from being enacted and its incitement and provocation of millions of persons and workers to commit crimes. During these incidents, various crimes were committed such as murder, attempted murder, destruction of goods owned by the public and private sectors, occupation of businesses by force, and resisting and attacking state forces. In the provinces of Istanbul and Kocaeli, security for life and property disappeared in an instant, and proclamation of martial law became imperative.

"The form of action that was utilized as the first large mass workers' activity was used again and again for the purpose of exploiting various problems of the community and to create a people's movement, and workers were pushed into committing crimes en masse. In short: A. A general

strike termed 'general mourning' was called on 16 September 1976. B. A general strike termed 'a warning to fascism' took place on 20 March 1978 following the 16 March incidents at Istanbul University.

1 May Demonstrations

"C. A general strike of small scope was also called as a result of instructions given in the form of a work slowdown or stoppage at places of business for the purpose of protesting the martial law administration's 30 April 1980 ban on celebrating the 1 May by means of meetings and demonstration marches. In addition: 1. Each year, Istanbul's Taksim Square was renamed the 1 May Square and was transformed into an arena of bloody, communist activity. 2. Meetings termed 'meetings for democracy' were scheduled in Istanbul and other large cities in Turkey and various forms of agitation were initiated at these meetings. 3. In fact, strikes in the public and private sectors that should have had economic and social attributes and that were required to take place in a legal manner were exploited by the adoption of purposefully irreconcilable attitudes for the purpose of prolonging them and, in this way, of destroying the state's economic power.

Incidents Not Coincidental

"We immediately wish to speak briefly in terms of a general outline of the type of mass incident that took place. Although all these incidents appear to have been turned over separately to judicial bodies, when all these isolated activities are taken as a whole, it is evident that they were not merely coincidental in nature, springing forth from the conditions of the day, that they were not isolated. To the contrary, it is obvious that they were programmed for the establishment of the desired Marxist-Leninist regime.

War Against State

"DISK, which claimed to be engaged in class and mass unionism, used the innocent masses and workers as a weapon against the state through the activities cited here, acted with the thought and purpose of keeping the state under constant economic, political, and social pressure, of paralyzing the mechanisms and authority of the state, and, in this way, of creating an environment for rebellion and revolution. As a result, it pushed Turkey so far that, according to friend and foe alike, the 12 September 1980 action of the military was unavoidable.

"Keeping in mind all these essential facts, the war waged against the state that we touched upon in brief has rendered it necessary for our military prosecutor's office to bring action against DISK for the violation of TCK Articles 141 and 146."

11571
NSO: 1644/68

EKSI FORESEES PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 28 Jun 81 pp 1,13

[Text] Bursa (HHA)--A seminar on the subject of "Turkey 1981 and financing problems in industry" began in Kirazliayla. Prof Dr Akin Ilkin gave the opening speech. Following this, HURRIYET newspaper editor Oktay Eksi and Mehmet Barlas from the MILLIYET newspaper gave speeches in which they expressed their views on the topic of "probable developments in Turkey during 1981."

In his speech, HURRIYET newspaper editor Eksi presented his ideas regarding the State Presidency Supervisory Council Law and said that there is evidence that Turkey will soon make the transition to a presidential system. He continued:

"The nine members of the supervisory council have not yet been named. This law is extremely important, because it is evidence that Turkey has reached the point where it can return to the presidential system. By the end of 1981, the most important topic will be new constitutional order. Laws that have been passed since the 12 September change in government and speeches given by official spokesmen are leading the way for the public. It is understood that, under the new constitution, universities, workers' organizations, and other groups will not be able to exist under the same conditions as they did during the era of the 1961 Constitution. I am afraid that political parties as well will no longer deem as strong and sound as in the past the principle of the 1961 Constitution which assured that political parties are 'an inescapable basic element.'"

In his speech at the seminar, Barlas, writer for the MILLIYET newspaper, said, "By the end of 1981, the solution to the most pressing problem, the structure of the constituent assembly, will have been reached."

Barlas stated that, from the atmosphere made apparent following State Chairman General Kenan Evren's speech in Amasya and from the opinion that is widespread in Ankara, it is evident that the constituent assembly will include a small number of members who are not part of the administrative staffs of the Justice Party or the Republican People's Party.

Barlas noted that the number of these members has not yet been determined, but said that there is a strong possibility that some former deputies and senators from the two parties who are on the security council will be named to the constituent assembly. He reported that a portion of the important problems of 1981 concerns political court cases and asserted that the amount of time it takes to complete these cases and the decisions reached will have an effect on the amount of time it takes to make the transition to democracy.

11673

CSO: 4654/68

CDU'S MARX FAVORS U.S. TROOPS NEARER EASTERN BORDER

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 17 Jul 81 p 4

[Article by fy.: "How 'Roughly' Is Bonn Treating America? — Washington Wants To Relocate Units Near Inner-German Border"]

[Text] Bonn, 16 July — Werner Marx (CDU), chairman of the Defense Committee, took the floor on Thursday in the debate over the U.S. desire to station some of its troops in the FRG closer to the zonal border and to build new military posts for them in the vicinity of the border. Marx spoke in favor of supporting the implementation of such plans.

In the first phase, the Americans would like to shift brigade-size units from the western part of the FRG to Wildflecken, Grafenwoehr and Wetzlar. The FRG Government was first informed of this desire in January 1980, through then minister of state von Dohnanyi. In April 1980, it was similarly presented to Defense Minister Hans Apel in the so-called "Stoessel demarche." While Apel was in Washington in March of this year on his first visit with the new American secretary of state [sic] Weinberger, the eight demands contained in the Stoessel demarche were indeed discussed, but Apel took the position in Washington that the issues involved with a repositioning of American troop units in the FRG, as well as most of the other demands in the Stoessel document, were not under his jurisdiction and he could consequently not negotiate on them. The Defense Ministry has maintained this position to date.

The cost of implementing the Americans' desires to relocate is estimated at a total of DM 4 billion in Bonn. In view of the government's financial problems, the German side appears to be unwilling to accommodate the Americans' wishes. A report on this subject published by the HERALD TRIBUNE a few days ago quoted General Brandt, inspector-general of the Bundeswehr, as saying that he thought it would be simpler to station cruise missiles on the moon than to put American units into new quarters near the border. The general's statement was apparently designed to express the attitude of those now in positions of responsibility.

By contrast, Marx said on Saturday that his party was pressing for the government to look into the defense policy aspects of the American proposals as soon as possible. He said this was necessary so that decisions could be made without further delay on "what there will be to build, renovate and finance on what scale and in what sequence." Marx indicated at the same time that his Defense Committee, which has already discussed the Stoessel paper this year — and thus the question of relocating

American troops to posts near the border — will be taking up this issue again. Moreover, he spoke critically of "demonstrably rough treatment" of this important issue by the FRG Government. He welcomed the idea of a stronger American commitment, which would make the forward defense force more credible and reduce the danger of being unable to defend the eastern third of the FRG in the event of war.

To be sure, Marx also said that the relocation of military posts involves problems, above all with the acquisition of the necessary land. Nevertheless, he said, "we must get reaccustomed to the fact that peace is preserved not through demonstrations and anti-weapons slogans; it demands concrete sacrifices." Nor should the motives of the Americans be questioned by those for whom they have spent so much of their own money in contributions to defense capabilities, nor should they be brusquely told that the Federal Republic has its own political and financial problems.

7458

CSO: 3103/378

ORGANIZATION, DUTIES OF GROUND FORCES TECHNICAL SECTION

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Jul 81 pp 152-53

[Text] The Ground Forces Technical Section (STAT), under the command of a general officer and stationed at Satory, in the Parisian suburbs, has the mission of advising the command on everything concerning equipment. The Technical Section performs its function at all stages of equipment development, and especially at the evaluation stage.

Functions

During the conceptualization and requirement definition phase, the ground forces technical section participates in the work of the staff and the permanent consultative commissions.

During the program initiation and study phase, the STAT participates in the preparation of the terms of reference for the program, monitors the studies produced by the technical directorate, and eventually performs the first series of biotechnological tests on mock-ups. After the creation of prototypes, STAT first refines, with the technical directorate and the technical center concerned, the program of official evaluation; monitors the technical evaluation tests conducted by the technical directorate; carries out the first part of the military evaluation, which is called technical testing and which is carried out in an operational environment; and finally prepares for the ground forces staff the technical testing report, which integrates results obtained by the builder, the technical directorate, and STAT, and recommends either adoption of the equipment or its rejection, or a new evaluation after modification.

After manufacturing has moved into the industrial phase and the first models have come off the assembly line, STAT performs the second part of the military evaluation called tactical testing which is carried out among the troops or in school. STAT takes part in establishing the program and monitors this testing of equipment from the pre-production run, or prototype production, and summarizes the results in a report.

Finally, when it is time to put the equipment into service, STAT:

- provides the chairmanship of the logistics board
- participates, with the office for industrial inspection or armaments, in setting

- conditions for admission into service, and eventually, in the reception of the first items of equipment
- participates in the preparation of technical documents and in the work of the modification board
 - provides assistance to the first owners of the equipment

Organization

The composition of STAT's personnel is about two-thirds military and one-third civilian.

The military are officers and non-commissioned officers, both men and women, active or reserve, and scientists and enlisted military. The civilians are engineers, technicians, workers, and administrators.

STAT is divided, in addition to its general branches, into specialized testing groups and detachments stationed throughout the country.

Specialized Testing Groups

Most of the testing groups carry out their activities in areas covering the specific equipment of one branch of the service, such as groups for infantry, armored vehicles, artillery/missiles, engineers, communications, airborne, ground force light aviation.

Other testing groups are not adapted to a particular branch, such as groups for biotechnology, battlefield surveillance, nuclear and chemical weapons.

Only rarely is a question treated by a single group. Generally, a pilot group is designated to insure coordination of the work of the various groups involved, to get their advice, and to synthesize the combined effort.

Detachments

Three detachments are stationed at Angers, Bourges, and Toulon, near installations of the general directorate for specialized armament in the evaluation of armaments of diverse categories.

In conjunction with the pilot groups, the detachments carry out the testing requested of them, insure support for the groups' testing personnel, and monitor the development of the studies, the manufacturing, and the tests conducted by other technical means of the technical directorate for land-warfare armaments.

9816

CSO: 3100/835

BRIEFS

CBN WARFARE TRAINING--Training in skills for protection against CBN [Chemical, Biological, Nuclear] danger in the armored or mechanized units too often remains theoretical. To introduce necessary realism into this training, the Fifth Dragoons Regiment planned and organized an original training group. Installed inside a hangar of the Hoche-Marceau District in Kaiserslautern, this CBN defense training unit consists essentially of a reinforced concrete honeycomb cell opening on the outside and capable of accommodating an AMX 30 tank or a group of 40 men. The unit has available an internal lighting system, a gas exhaust system for armored vehicles, a dispersal apparatus for toxic-like products, and an outside command post making it possible to observe the inside of the cell, to be in touch with the tank's crew, and to control the flow of gas in the cell. The unit also has a ventilation fan for gas exhaust. The arrangement makes it possible to carry out directed moves of the personnel in a contaminated environment, CBN instruction sessions on board the AMX 30 or the AMX 10 tank, the summary decontamination of the tanks and verification of the equipment for putting the AMX 30's or AMX 10's into overdrive. The rest of the hangar makes possible access in ready position to the two decontamination systems of the unit, outfitted dummies, and various equipment. Also installed in this structure is an area for the storage of sensitive CBN defense equipment and the 2B specialized workshop. Assembled by the barracks construction corps, this training unit cost 45,000 francs. Corps commanders: Initiative and imagination make it possible to introduce efficiency and realism into basic training in CBN defense measures. [Text] [Paris TERRE-INFORMATION in French Jun 81 p 7] 2662

CSO: 3100/859

OFFICIAL COMMENTS ON DANISH STANCE ON NEW INFORMATION ORDER

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 13 Jul 81 p 6

[Article by Knud Vilby]

[Text] The latest issue of the IPI Report, which is the official monthly publication of the International Press Institute, contains an article indicating that the free press is now preparing for battle against a new information order "which would limit the free flow of information."

At a meeting in May in the French town of Talloires, representatives of the Western news media stressed that freedom of the press is a human right and they condemned all forms of censorship. But is it correct that the demands of the developing countries for a so-called new order in communication and information mean that they want to censor the press and control those involved with it?

This is one of the topics taken up by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization--UNESCO--in recent years. It is here the developing countries have pressed their demands for a new information order and it is here the Western countries have fought for freedom of the press. In the opinion of some critics, the Western countries have gone too far to reach a compromise.

Briefly stated, the situation is that most people, including Western journalists, recognize that the developing countries have pointed out a problem that has been overlooked to some extent. Many developing countries learn more about Europe than about their neighboring countries. The predominant news sources are primarily Western ones. The entertainment and information transmitted via radio, TV, and films are also dominated by Western cultural views.

We must admit that people in developing countries are in an unsatisfactory situation. However, some developing countries (supported by the East) favor control over the free flow of news to achieve a balance--control to see that journalists work objectively, or for peace.

Governments in many developing countries are authoritarian themselves and, in our opinion, undemocratic. They do not want real freedom of the press.

Conversely, the Western countries must say that they can offer assistance in this area only if our principles concerning the free press--including its right to criticize governments--are respected.

Compromises have been achieved in UNESCO, but in the opinion of the Danish UNESCO National Commission, the Western Countries--or Denmark--have not compromised basic principles. It is also our opinion that the great majority of developing countries prefer to cooperate with the West for practical technical, professional, and economic support in an attempt to solve some of the problems caused by the imbalance.

This summer developments have occurred in three areas of the UNESCO debate and the new information order:

1. A new program associated with UNESCO, the International Program for Development of Communications (IPDC) held its first meeting in Paris. Norway is participating with Nordic support and the Norwegian representative, Gunnar Garbo, is the chairman of the council. This organization is attempting to establish criteria for aid to developing countries and, despite ideological overtones and disunity, the first meeting was relatively quiet and practically oriented.
2. UNESCO's member nations have been asked to submit ideas for UNESCO's next long-term plan, for 1983 to 1989 for all areas in which UNESCO is active. Denmark gave a comprehensive reply, mentioned in the feature article on Friday. On the topic of communications, the Danish reply stated clearly that problems of imbalance in the area of communications must not be solved "by introducing additional restrictions, but by developing the possibility of greater access to both official and unofficial sources and by greater freedom for the flow of news and information."
3. Finally, UNESCO's member nations have been asked to assess in detail how UNESCO should follow up a task set up in an international (global) commission for the study of communications problems (McBride Commission). Here the Danish response follows similar lines.

It is stressed that new channels of information should be opened and that weak channels should be strengthened. The developing countries themselves must give priority to this area, but it is also admitted that the developed countries must offer support. It is recognized that tendencies toward monopolization can also create problems in our own culture, but here criticism can always be heard. It is stressed that when governments wish to control the press, or if journalists must have a license to work, this does not lead to increased freedom and information, but to control. The freedom to seek and report information is a fundamental right.

The answer was formulated on the basis of work by a broad committee of experts with representatives of the press, under the leadership of the Danish UNESCO National Commission. It is hardly possible to misinterpret the Danish position.

Denmark, in return, has a responsibility to support practical aid in these areas. So far, Holland has promised about 4 million Danish kroner in aid to the new program (IPDC). Norway has promised support, without stating any specific amount.

Denmark has not yet made a decision, but Denmark has previously supported communications projects, including UNESCO projects.

END OF

FICHE

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